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INTRODUCTION
The idea that consideration of error costs should inform judgments
about actions with uncertain consequences is well established. When we act
on imperfect information, we estimate not only the probability of an event,
but also the expected costs of making an error. To take a simple example, if
a driver is stopped at the tracks and sees a train coming, she must decide
whether to cross or wait for the train to pass. Using her eyes and experience,
she can only estimate how far away the train is or how fast it is moving. She
may guess wrong. Assume it is equally likely that her estimate will be either
too long or too short. However, if she errs on the side of caution, she will
have lost a few minutes waiting while the train passes. If she errs in the other
direction, however, she might lose her life, those of her passengers, and her
automobile.
*James
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While the probability of error might be even, the stakes are asymmetric.
In the example they are so wildly asymmetric that prudence suggests a strong
bias in favor of waiting. For example, assume that the likelihood of a wrong
estimate is unbiased and fifty-fifty in either direction. However, if the cost
of a false positive (waiting unnecessarily) is $2 in lost time while the cost of
a false negative (getting hit) is $10 million, the driver will be strongly biased
in favor of waiting. Even if not getting hit is significantly more likely, the
imbalance in consequences will incline her to wait.
Antitrust decision makers, including judges, are in a similar situation.
Information about the consequences of a contemplated enforcement action
is imperfect. An injunction, divestiture, or other remedy could be
overdeterrent, but failure to grant the remedy could be underdeterrent.
Should the standard for action be “more likely than not,” which is neutral?
Or should we have a bias that favors either enforcement or non-enforcement?
The problem of error cost bias has had a broad and deep influence in
antitrust cases, long before it was articulated in those words. It affects the
formation of presumptions and burdens of proof. For example, it guided the
Supreme Court’s sixty-year presumption, first developed in the 1940s, that
patents posed inherent dangers to competition. As a result, they should be
presumed to create market power in at least some cases.1 In 1950 it resulted
in amendments to the Clayton Act that produced a significant proenforcement bias in merger policy.2 That bias led Justice Potter Stewart to
observe in a dissent that the “sole consistency” he could find in merger cases
was that “the Government always wins.”3
The modern error-cost argument favoring non-enforcement of antitrust
law is popularly attributed to Judge Frank Easterbrook’s important 1984
article on The Limits of Antitrust. He wrote:
A fundamental difficulty facing the court is the
incommensurability of the stakes. If the court errs by condemning
a beneficial practice, the benefits may be lost for good. Any other
firm that uses the condemned practice faces sanctions in the name
of stare decisis, no matter the benefits. If the court errs by
permitting a deleterious practice, though, the welfare loss
decreases over time. Monopoly is self-destructive. Monopoly
1. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (speaking of patent
monopoly as making post-patent practices competitively suspect); International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (applying the presumption of monopoly power in an
antitrust case). Both decisions were overruled by Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc.,
547 U.S. 28 (2006).
2. See discussion infra, text at notes 107–111.
3. United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Steward, J.,
dissenting).
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prices eventually attract entry. True, this long run may be a long
time coming, with loss to society in the interim. The central
purpose of antitrust is to speed up the arrival of the long run. But
this should not obscure the point: judicial errors that tolerate
baleful practices are self-correcting while erroneous
condemnations are not.4
Easterbrook found support in the belief that monopoly is “selfdestructive” and that the social cost of an anticompetitive practice “decreases
over time.”5 In the long run markets move themselves toward greater
competition, he argued, provided that the legal system does not intervene. A
false positive will delay the arrival of this long run, while a false negative
will let the market move unmolested to its more competitive equilibrium.
An unfortunate, overly aggressive antitrust decree can force firms to pull
their competitive punches or even prohibit efficient activity. In that case the
purifying process would be slowed or even stopped.6
Important Supreme Court decisions in subsequent years used the error
cost framework to justify rules limiting liability. For example, in Matsushita,
which greatly increased the likelihood of summary judgment in favor of
defendants in antitrust cases, the Court concluded that “mistaken inferences”
in favor of plaintiffs are “especially costly.”7 Later, in its Trinko decision,
which did a version of the same thing for motions to dismiss, the Court spoke
at length of the social cost of false positives.8 In sum, the antitrust error cost
framework shifted the ground radically against plaintiffs in the two most
important procedural antitrust decisions in decades.9 Expansive anti4. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1984)
(emphasis added). Judge Easterbrook was a law professor at the University of Chicago at the
time but became a judge on the Seventh Circuit in 1985. The error costs of rule-making had
been explored, although in different contexts, in Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEG. STUD. 257 (1974). For particular
application to predatory pricing law, see Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klovorick, A Framework
for Analysis Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979).
5. Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 2. For insightful objections, see Jonathan B. Baker,
Taking the Error out of “Error Cost” Analysis: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80
ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2015).
6. In other contexts, see Erik Hovenkamp & Steven C. Salop, Asymmetric Stakes in
Antitrust Litigation (USC Legal Stud. Res. Papers Series, Working Paper No. 20-12 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3563843 [https://perma.cc/MR53-8ZP
U].
7. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986) (citing
Easterbrook, supra note 4).
8. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
414–15 (2004).
9. See also Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
233 (1993) (citing Easterbrook, supra note 4) (emphasizing that competitive explanations
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enforcement rules for motions to dismiss and summary judgment have had a
considerable influence on antitrust litigation, upending a more neutral
balance that had existed for decades.10
This error cost framework also motivated the liability-limiting
Guidance on §2 of the Sherman Act that the Antitrust Division issued near
the end of the George W. Bush administration in 2008. The government’s
statement concluded that decisions about whether to bring §2 cases should
take error costs into account.11 “Decision theory teaches that optimal legal
standards should minimize the inevitable error and enforcement costs. . . .”12
The statement then went on to identify the costs of false positives and false
negatives, arguing that the cost of false positives was higher than the cost of
false negatives.13
The Antitrust Division’s statement on §2 was withdrawn less than a
year later, during the first year of the Obama administration.14 The
withdrawal statement concluded that the earlier document “raised too many
must be preferred when evidence is ambiguous); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum
Co., 495 U.S. 328, 345 (1990) (citing Easterbrook, supra note 4) (arguing similar principles
related to resale price maintenance).
10. See Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on
the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286,
364–66 (2013) (discussing trends in judicial procedure, especially dismissal mechanisms).
11. Single-Firm Conduct and Section 2 of the Sherman Act: An Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST. (Sept. 8, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/atr/competition-and-monopoly-single-firmconduct-under-section-2-sherman-act-chapter-1#N_106_ [https://perma.cc/LB7Z-MQ8L].
The FTC did not join the Antitrust Division in the Report.
12. Id. at part III-G.
13. Id., the statement continued:
In the common law regime of antitrust law, stare decisis inhibits courts from
routinely correcting errors or updating the law to reflect the latest advances in
economic thinking. Some believe that the persistence of errors can be particularly
harmful to competition in the case of false positives because “[i]f the court errs
by condemning a beneficial practice, the benefits may be lost for good. Any other
firm that uses the condemned practice faces sanctions in the name of stare decisis,
no matter the benefits.” In contrast, over time “monopoly is self-destructive.
Monopoly prices eventually attract entry. . . . [Thus] judicial errors that tolerate
baleful practices are self-correcting, while erroneous condemnations are not.”
This self-correcting tendency, however, may take substantial time. As a result,
courts and enforcers should be sensitive to the potential that, once created, some
monopolies may prove quite durable, especially if allowed to erect entry barriers
and engage in other exclusionary conduct aimed at artificially prolonging their
existence.
(citations omitted).
14. Justice Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST. (May 11, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-withdraws-reportantitrust-monopoly-law [https://perma.cc/X35U-EWNT].
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hurdles to government antitrust enforcement. . . .”15 Christina A. Varney,
head of the Antitrust Division, stated that “The Division will return to tried
and true case law and Supreme Court precedent in enforcing the antitrust
laws.”16
The Justice Department’s antitrust division once again used the error
cost idea in its statement of the “New Madison” doctrine during the Trump
administration. Under the statement, the Justice Department would largely
avoid antitrust enforcement of licensing agreements involving patents,
particularly patents that are essential to network standards.17
At this writing the statement of the “New Madison” doctrine appears to
be dead.18 The agencies have issued and solicited comment on a new draft
statement that largely repudiates the doctrine. The draft version it contains
no discussion of error cost bias.19 This pushback notwithstanding, the error
cost framework continues to capture some conservatives. It appeared in
2018 in the oral argument of the Ohio v. American Express case.20 Justice
Gorsuch queried, “why shouldn’t we take Judge Easterbrook’s admonition
seriously, that judicial errors are a lot harder to correct than an occasional
monopoly where you can hope and assume that the market will eventually
correct it. Judicial errors are very difficult to correct.”21
Justice Gorsuch’s question suggests a premise that has by no means
been established–namely, that judicial errors are harder or more costly to
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Just., The “New
Madison” Approach to Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law (Mar. 16, 2018) (transcript
available at Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim Delivers Keynote Address at
University of Pennsylvania Law School, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.ju
stice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-keynote-addressuniversity [https://perma.cc/VXB2-GECD]). For a critique, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The
DOJ’s “New Madison” Doctrine Disregards Both the Economics and the Law of Innovation,
PROMARKET (Sept. 8, 2021), https://promarket.org/2021/09/08/doj-madison-doctrine-antitrus
t-innovation/ [https://perma.cc/QD7F-YLWW].
18. See Kathryn Mims et al., DOJ Antitrust Division Quietly Walks Back Prior
Administration-Era Support of Standard Essential Patent Holders, WHITE & CASE (May 26,
2021), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/doj-antitrust-division-quietly-walks-ba
ck-prior-administration-era-support [https://perma.cc/F52C-U3PS] (discussing the Antitrust
Division’s reclassification of the 2020 Supplement as “advocacy”).
19 USPTO, NIST, and USDOJ, Draft Policy Statement on Licensing Negotiations and
Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/Rand Commitments, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. (Dec. 6, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1453826/do
wnload [https://perma.cc/GAB8-5BVQ].
20. 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
21. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018)
(No. 16-1454).
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correct than errors that lead to monopoly or other anticompetitive market
structures. Suppose that the two assumptions underlying the antienforcement error cost approach are incorrect. First, suppose that
competition is actually the more fragile state. Second, what if courts correct
pro-enforcement errors more quickly than Easterbrook assumed? If one or
both of these things are true, we could have the error-cost presumption
backwards. The consequence could be socially costly under-enforcement.
In his 2021 opinion for the Court in NCAA v. Alston, Justice Gorsuch
himself observed one strong consequence of anti-enforcement error cost
bias: plaintiffs lose nearly all of their rule of reason antitrust cases.22 Under
antitrust’s rule of reason, the plaintiff must make out a prima facie case of
competitive harm. The burden of proof then shifts to the defendant to
provide a justification. If the defendant succeeds, the burden shifts back to
the plaintiff to show that the same effect could have been achieved with a
less competitively harmful alternative.23 This three-step burden-shifting
framework is designed to be based on such enforcement-neutral factors as
the presence of market power and the nature and availability of evidence.24
Courts have responded by loading so many requirements into the plaintiff’s
prima facie case, however, that the burden rarely shifts. That is to say, it is
not really a “prima facie” case. Justice Gorsuch observed that the courts
have “disposed of nearly all rule of reason cases in the last 45 years” without
ever getting to the second step.25 Given that the best evidence for the motives
and effects of the defendant’s conduct is in the defendant’s control, the result
is a lopsided rule that ends up overlooking instances of competitive harm.
Easterbrook’s observations were based on a model of perfect
competition that was dominant at one time within Chicago School
economics, but by that time was already falling apart.26 The consequences
of a change in assumptions are difficult to exaggerate. If markets naturally
move away from competitive equilibria toward more dominated or less
competitive ones, then false negatives could be more costly than false
positives. For example, even an overly broad merger rule that prevented a
firm from attaining all available efficiencies via acquisition might be
preferable if it prevented the emergence of monopoly. This would be
22. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021). The best source
supporting that observation is Michael Carrier. See Michael A. Carrier, The Four-Step Rule
of Reason, 33 SPG ANTITRUST 50 (2019); Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason in the PostActavis World, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 25 (2018).
23. Id. at 2160 (citing Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284).
24. See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶1507 (4th ed.
2018).
25. See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2161.
26. See discussion infra, text at notes 222–252.
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particularly likely if the monopoly were costly, or if firms could develop
similar efficiencies without the need to merge.27 Merger analysis under the
antitrust enforcement Agencies’ 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines insists
that efficiencies must be shown to be “merger specific.” This means that
they would be unlikely to result from mechanisms other than the merger.28
By the 1980s Easterbrook was already writing defensively. The
framework he offered was relatively novel in law schools. However, the
economics upon which it was based was rapidly losing ground in mainstream
economics departments, replaced by alternatives that did better under testing
and provided more explanatory power for policy purposes.29 Further, they
favored intervention more frequently.30
The same thing was also true of the second blade of the scissors: by the
mid-eighties it was already quite clear that courts were readily capable of
correcting judicial errors of over-enforcement. There is no ratchet in
antitrust law making. While res judicata might require a court to adhere to a
ruling governing the same conduct by the same parties, beyond that both
courts and legislators are free to change their minds when new information
or policy initiatives emerge. Stare decisis tends to preserve some precise
rulings, but courts construe their own rulings more broadly or narrowly as
perspectives change. For example, in the early 1990s the Supreme Court
developed an aggressive “lock-in” theory of market power,31 but resistance
proved so substantial that few courts have applied it.32
By the time of Easterbrook’s error cost essay, the Supreme Court was
already well on its way to developing a more neutral way of dealing with
error costs.33 Further, some of the errors had not persisted all that long. For
27. On this point, see Louis Kaplow, Efficiencies in Merger Analysis, 83 ANTITRUST L.J.
557 (2021), who observes that most efficiencies are not merger specific because there are
good contractual alternatives. For a similar argument with respect to vertical mergers, see
Herbert Hovenkamp, Competitive Harm from Vertical Mergers, 59 REV. INDUS. ORG. 139
(2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3683386 [https://perma.cc/2DP
C-NKF7].
28. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §10
(2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010 [https://perma.c
c/2USF-T5VG].
29. For a good contemporary illustration, see FED. TRADE COMM’N, STRATEGY,
PREDATION AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS (Steven C. Salop ed., 1981), https://www.ftc.go
v/reports/strategy-predation-antitrust-analysis [https://perma.cc/6Q4V-MDJM] (recognizing
that predatory and other exclusionary pricing strategies were rising in the economics literature
just as they were being denigrated in the legal literature).
30. See discussion infra, text at notes 222–252.
31. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
32. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE §3.3a (6th ed. 2020) (discussing “lock-in”).
33. See generally Carl Shapiro, Antitrust: What Went Wrong and How to Fix It, 35
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example, in Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania the Supreme Court overruled a
per se rule against vertical nonprice restraints that at the time was only ten
years old.34 That rule had reflected a strong pro-enforcement bias that was
based on a severe misunderstanding of vertical distribution systems in a
product differentiated economy. By that time the Court had also
significantly strengthened the market power requirement for tying cases,35
raised the requirements for proof of competitive harm in private antitrust
actions,36 and considerably cut back on the strongly structural premises of
merger enforcement in the 1960s.37 All of these were positive developments
that aligned antitrust with more centrist economic theory. Two years after
The Limits of Antitrust was written, the Court would dramatically alter the
doctrine of summary judgment, making it considerably more difficult for
plaintiffs to get to trial.38 By 1984 both of the premises of the antienforcement error cost bias were demonstrably false.
This article explores the origins of the error-cost anti-enforcement bias
in antitrust. It focuses mainly on the first of Judge Easterbrook’s premises,
which is that markets tend to correct themselves unless overly aggressive
antitrust rules get in the way. The origins of that premise stretch back to the
Chicago School’s development in the 1940s.39 Many of its founders were
members of the libertarian and positivist Mont Pelerin Society.40 The
ANTITRUST, Summer 2021, at 33, http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/fixingantitrust.pdf
[https://perma.cc/28EP-83J3] (discussing the historical disconnect between federal antitrust
enforcement and microeconomics).
34. Continental TV, Inc. vs. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)).
35. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enter., 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
36. Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519
(1983) (narrowing private plaintiff standing); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429
U.S. 477 (1977) (requiring “antitrust injury”).
37. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974) (weakening merger
presumptions based on market share).
38. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
39. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp & Fiona Scott Morton, Framing the Chicago
School of Antitrust Analysis, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1843 (2020) (placing the Chicago School in
the antitrust framework).
40. Id. at 1847–48; Rob Van Horn and Philip Mirowski, The Rise of the Chicago School
of Economics and the Birth of Neoliberalism, in THE ROAD FROM MONT PELERIN: THE
MAKING OF THE NEOLIBERAL THOUGHT COLLECTIVE, 158 (Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe
eds., 2015). For a good short essay on the relationship among the Mont Pelerin Society and
Chicago School intellectuals such as Aaron Director, see William Kolasky, Aaron Director
and the Origins of the Chicago School of Antitrust, Part II—Aaron Director: The Socrates of
Hyde Park, 35 ANTITRUST 101 (2020). On the early development, focusing on the Chicago
economics department, see BUILDING CHICAGO ECONOMICS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE
HISTORY OF AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL ECONOMICS PROGRAM (Robert Van Horn, Philip
Mirowski & Thomas A. Stapleford eds., 2011).
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Society’s stated commitment to scientific testability proved to be its undoing,
as imperfect competition models came to win the testability battle.41
The Chicago School approach to antitrust economics began its
ascendancy in American law schools in the late 1970s, just as its influence
was waning in economics departments.42 Today it is in sharp decline even
among legal academics.43 Further, there is ample evidence that, at least at
the market level, monopoly is hardly uncommon and that it often fails to
correct itself.44 The social cost of monopoly today is very likely much higher
than the literature from the Chicago School’s early period imagined.45 Both
the ubiquity and the persistence of monopoly in the economy have been well
established under a variety of methodologies.46 Monopoly markups are
significantly higher than they were in the 1980s, and by some measures have
tripled.47 This sounds like a great deal more than the “occasional” and
ephemeral monopoly that Justice Gorsuch acknowledged.
Judge Easterbrook suggested that the cost of any monopoly resulting
41. See discussion infra, text at notes 165–229.
42. See Baker, supra note 5, at 1 n.1 (2015) (speaking of Chicago School economics as
flourishing until the mid-seventies and of its dominance in law schools arising in the mid- to
late 1970s). See also Nicola Giocoli, Old Lady Charm: Explaining the Persistent Approach
of Chicago Antitrust, 22 J. ECON. METHODOLOGY 96 (2015) (searching for explanations why
the Chicago School has persisted in law schools long after it faded in economic departments).
43. Although not among all. See, e.g., Thomas A. Lambert, The Limits of Antitrust in the
21st Century, 68 U. KAN. L. REV. 1087 (2020); George L. Priest, The Limits of Antitrust and
the Chicago School Tradition, 6 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 1 (2009) (both defending the error cost
model).
44. See discussion infra, text at notes 253–263.
45. See, e.g., Arnold Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 77 AM. ECON. ASSN.
PAPER & PROC. 77 (1953) (limiting social cost of monopoly to its formal deadweight loss
cause by inefficient customer substitutions). Contra, Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of
Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975) (social cost of monopoly much higher
when rent seeking is acknowledged). The literature is evaluated in Herbert Hovenkamp,
Antitrust Policy and the Social Cost of Monopoly, 78 IOWA L. REV. 371 (1993).
46. See discussion infra, text at notes 253–263.
47. See discussion infra, text at notes 253–263; Bonnie Kavoussi, How Market Power
Has Increased U.S. Inequality, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (May 3, 2019), https://
equitablegrowth.org/how-market-power-has-increased-u-s-inequality/ [https://perma.cc/MG
9Z-VP7M]; Companies Appear to be Gaining Market Power, ECONOMIST (Jul. 6, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/07/06/companies-appear-to-be-gaining-mar
ket-power [https://perma.cc/9PMA-5XFN]; Federico Diez et al., Global Declining
Competition, CTR. FOR ECON. AND POLICY RES. (Aug. 2, 2019), https://voxeu.org/article/glob
al-declining-competition [https://perma.cc/MWV3-95G5] (each offering examples of
markups as a result of consolidate market power since the 1980s). For a balanced discussion,
see Jeff Cockrell, Does America Have an Antitrust Problem?, CHICAGO BOOTH REV. (2019),
https://review.chicagobooth.edu/economics/2019/article/does-america-have-antitrust-proble
m?fbclid=IwAR0ZXwFnUE2t0tcobHLcgMa6SviSZUShufBR1nvHUd6sDzm73o4guVOly_
k [https://perma.cc/8ERS-FZ5E].
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from an underdeterrent legal rule will decrease over time. Whether or not
that is true, it is clearly the case for overdeterrent rules. Firms are pretty
good at inventing around legal rules. An incorrectly issued injunction might
have very little consequence if those bound by it can simply select another
route. The urge to compete is particularly robust and firms often can invent
around an unreasonably restrictive legal rule. For example, the per se rules
against resale price maintenance and tying were excessive, but firms
developed workarounds.48 An overly aggressive decision condemning a
merger might not cause that much harm if the firms can attain the benefits of
merging by another route.
The economic case for an error cost bias against antitrust enforcement
was losing ground at the time it was articulated in the 1980s and is even less
defensible today. Further, it fails to protect antitrust’s goals of facilitating
high output and low prices. That leaves the question of whether there should
be such a presumption at all and, if so, what it should be.
Given what we know about markets today, if we were forced to make a
presumption, a pro-enforcement bias would be preferable, at least in troubleprone markets.49 But I am not advocating for that. Rather, the screens that
antitrust already uses in the formation of substantive rules should suffice.
Among these, the most important are the rule of reason and its accompanying
requirement of market power. When these prerequisites are taken seriously,
an error cost bias in either direction represents a form of double counting that
threatens to undermine sound enforcement goals.
Merger policy in particular has waffled between a fairly extreme proenforcement bias developed after the 1950 amendments to the merger statute
to a fairly extreme anti-enforcement bias developed in the 1970s and 1980s.50
It would benefit from a stronger pro-enforcement presumption than the one
that we currently have, although not as extreme as the ones that the Supreme
Court developed in the 1960s.51 The way to get there, however, is not with
an error cost presumption in either direction, but rather by continual
empirical testing of post-acquisition results in order to determine whether we
48. E.g., Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronic Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988)
(construing “price” narrowly in RPM cases); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2 (1984) (strengthening market power requirement for tying cases under per se rule); U.
S. v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (establishing idiosyncratic agreement requirement
for resale price maintenance).
49. See discussion infra, text at notes 53–86.
50. See discussion infra, text at notes 100–105.
51. See Kevin Bryan & Erik Hovenkamp, Startup Acquisitions, Error Costs, and
Antitrust Policy, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 331 (2020); Kevin Bryan & Erik Hovenkamp, Antitrust
Limits on Startup Acquisitions, 56 REV. INDUS. ORG. 615 (2020) (analyzing historical merger
enforcement trends).
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have set our sights too high or too low, as well as periodic revision of the
Merger Guidelines in order to reflect what we continue to learn.52 No rule
of judicial stare decisis prevents that.
THE WANING OF PERFECT COMPETITION
Easterbrook’s article reflected the neoliberal mindset of the 1980s,
popularized in antitrust in the work of Robert Bork.53 Its anti-enforcement
framework has persisted among conservatives, as Justice Gorsuch’s question
suggests.54 In fact, however, the theoretical and empirical foundations for an
anti-enforcement error cost bias were crumbling already by the 1980s, even
as Bork and Easterbrook were writing. Their arguments were largely
defensive and nostalgic.
The debate in industrial organization economics over market
competitiveness began mainly during the 1930s and after.55 The underlying
question was whether the older theory of oligopoly or more recent theories
of imperfect competition, including monopolistic competition, described
important and durable characteristics of the economy. Or were they simply
minor and short-lived deviations from a much more robust perfect
competition model in which competition, collusion, and monopoly described
all the relevant states of the world? Or worse yet, as Robert Bork would
suggest, was oligopoly something that did not exist at all except in
economics textbooks?56
Classical Competition and the Twentieth Century Response
Prior to the 1930s, economists understood markets within a framework
that embraced two alternative structures: perfect competition and monopoly.
In the course of reviewing attacks on that model, George J. Stigler observed
in 1949, “[b]efore the Great Depression . . . economists had generally looked
52. E.g., JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE
ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY, 10–29 (2014) (suggesting empirical models for measuring
concentrations and changes in concentrations of antitrust enforcement actions).
53. See Hovenkamp & Morton, supra note 39, at 1847–48.
54. See also supra discussion accompanying note 21.
55. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial
Organization, 68 TEX. L. REV. 105 (1989).
56. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 221
(1978) (“[N]on-collusive oligopolistic behavior, to the extent that it exists at all (and I am not
persuaded that such behavior occurs outside of economics textbooks), rarely results in any
significant ability to restrict output. If that estimate is substantially accurate, then most
mergers would not involve any dead-weight loss. . . .”).
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upon the economy as a mixture of industries that approximated conditions of
perfect competition and industries that were ‘monopolies.’”57
That framework was developed and largely unquestioned by the British
classical political economists all the way back to Adam Smith. The great
marginalist economist Alfred Marshall adhered to it in his Principles of
Economics, which was published in 1890. His book recognized competition
and monopoly but almost nothing in between.58 While he was aware of
Cournot’s theory of oligopoly,59 he did not incorporate it in any systematic
way.60 Marshall’s most influential Eighth Edition, published in 1920, cited
Cournot a few times for things such as the definition of a market, but not for
his theory of oligopoly. Indeed, his book never used the word “oligopoly.”61
Marshall’s approach of ignoring markets that fell between perfect
competition and monopoly was described later as a “monstrosity.”62
Marshall had devoted a great deal of attention to a phenomenon, monopoly,
that did not exist outside the realm of public utilities or other state granted
exclusive franchises, while ignoring phenomena that were far more common
in industry. This also meant that Marshall simply assumed that all firms in
a market faced the same demand curve. As a result, there was no concept of
a distinct “residual” demand for the output of a single firm in a multi-firm
market. Outside of monopoly, there was nothing interesting to study about
the demand facing a single firm.
The most important protagonists of alternative models were Joan
Robinson of Cambridge, a student and admirer of Marshall, and Edward
Chamberlin of Harvard. Both published important books in 1933.63
Robinson never mentioned Cournot in her Economics of Imperfect
57. George J. Stigler, Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect, in FIVE LECTURES ON
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 12 (1949).
58. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1890).
59. Developed in AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL
PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH (1838) (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., 1897).
60. Alberto Zanni, Marshall and Sraffa on Competition and Returns in Cournot, 20 HIST.
ECON. IDEAS 75 (2012).
61. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (8th ed. 1920), https://oll.libertyfund
.org/title/marshall-principles-of-economics-8th-ed [https://perma.cc/5C9P-YX9K]. On the
influence of Marshall’s work on Progressive era antitrust policy, see Herbert Hovenkamp,
The Progressive Antitrust Toolbox (U.. PA. L. & ECON. RES., Jan. 2022), available at https:/
/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3995502 [https://perma.cc/53V3-AB67].
62. Kurt W. Rotschild, Price Theory and Oligopoly, 57 ECON. J. 299 (1947).
63. JOAN ROBINSON, THE THEORY OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1933); EDWARD H.
CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1933). For examples of
important and influential predecessors who dealt with the importance of differences among
individual firms, see JOHN MAURICE CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS
(1925); Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41 (1929); Steven C. Salop,
Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods, 10 BELL J. ECON. 141 (1979).
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Competition, although she did develop some concepts, such as marginal
revenue, that Cournot himself had either anticipated or developed.64
Chamberlin’s book began with an extended discussion of Cournot, but then
branched off into theories about product differentiation for which his book
later became best known. Later neoliberal critics adhered more to the
Marshallian status quo, most notably economists George Stigler65 and Milton
Friedman.66
The extensive debate that erupted over Robinson’s and Chamberlin’s
work led to a dramatic increase of interest in Cournot and oligopoly theory.
The influential British economist Sir John Hicks described it in 1935 as a
“renaissance.”67 In fact, it was oligopoly theory more than either Robinson
or Chamberlin that in the short run migrated into antitrust enforcement
policy. It contributed to such actions as Sugar Institute vs. United States,
which condemned an agreement to use a cartel facilitator,68 as well as the
Interstate Circuit69 and American Tobacco cases.70 In these, the Supreme
Court condemned parallel conduct without proof of an explicit agreement.
64. See A.J. Nichols, Robinson’s Economics of Imperfect Competition, 42 J. POL. ECON.
249, 252 (1934) (discussing marginal revenue). Alfred Marshall also had a conception of
marginal revenue, which he referred to as “net” revenue. See ALFRED MARSHALL,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, Book V, Chapter XIV, at 477–78 (8th ed. 1920):
The prima facie interest of the owner of a monopoly is clearly to adjust the supply
to the demand, not in such a way that the price at which he can sell his commodity
shall just cover its expenses of production, but in such a way as to afford him the
greatest possible total net revenue.
65. See discussion infra, text at notes 109–117. While Easterbrook discussed Stigler in
The Limits of Antitrust, he addressed only Stigler’s theory of regulation, not his theory of
market competition. Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 4–5.
66. See discussion infra, text at notes 137–141.
67. John R. Hicks, Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, 3
ECONOMETRICA 1, 13 (1935). See Manuela Mosca, The Sources of Monopoly Power Before
Bain (1956) 2 (SSRN Working Paper 2009), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1430322 [https://perma.cc/77FB-PV32] (discussing monopoly theories
before this era).
68. Sugar Inst. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936) (condemning sugar refiners’
agreement to post their prices periodically and adhere to them).
69. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). See also Maurice
Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1317–18
(1948) (summarizing the Interstate case).
70. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946). For contemporary
writing relating the decision to the theory of oligopoly, see William H. Nicholls, The Tobacco
Case of 1946, 39 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS) 284, 285–88 (1949); Kenneth
E. Boulding, The Economic Consequences of Some Recent Antitrust Decisions, 39 AM. ECON.
REV. (PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS) 311, 320 (1949). See also WILLIAM FELLNER, COMPETITION
AMONG THE FEW: OLIGOPOLY AND SIMILAR MARKET STRUCTURES (1949) (noting American
Tobacco’s large market share in the tobacco industry).
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Indeed, the American Tobacco case went further in that direction than the
more recent case law. Another contemporary enforcement phenomenon was
greatly increased interest in basing-point pricing, or situations where
producers of fungible products could coordinate by eliminating competition
on shipping costs.71 An area that reflected the influence of monopolistic
competition theory was the 1940s Justice Department’s greatly increased
scrutiny of intellectual property practices. Patents and trademarks in
particular were thought to be important vehicles for maintaining monopoly
and unhealthy product differentiation.72 One important example was the
previously noted Supreme Court’s 1947 conclusion in International Salt Co.
v. United States, at the behest of the Government, that monopoly would be
presumed from the existence of a patent.73 Chamberlin himself was
particularly hostile toward trademarks, which he believed were inherently
monopolistic because they served to protect space between differentiated
products.74
Accompanying the increased focus on imperfectly competitive markets
was a mathematical revolution in economic writing, including incorporation
of game theory in the 1940s and 1950s.75 In the process, the “pure” versions
of Cournot’s oligopoly, Robinson’s imperfect competition, and
Chamberlin’s monopolistic competition lost much of their distinctiveness.
They gradually became blended together into a set of theories that today go
71. See Arthur Smithies, Economic Consequences of the Basing Point Decisions, 63
HARV. L. REV. 308 (1949) (relating basing-point schemes to monopolistic competition); Note,
Price Systems and Competition: The Basing-Point Issues, 58 YALE L.J. 426 (1949)
(addressing basing-point pricing as a problem of oligopoly); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333
U.S. 583 (1948) (enforcing FTC order condemning basing point pricing in cement).
72. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT, 1870–1970, 198–203 (2015) (discussing the history of economic thought regarding
patents and trademarks as monopoly and differentiation vehicles).
73. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
74. CHAMBERLIN, supra note 63, at 57–64. On the impact on competition, see Ralph S.
Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE
L.J. 1165, 1171 n.29 (1948) (speaking of Chamberlin’s influence); Kurt Borchart, Are
Trademarks an Antitrust Problem?, 31 GEO. L.J. 245 (1943). For contemporary views on the
use of patents to segregate markets, see DAVID LYNCH, THE CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC
POWER 227–31 (1946).
75. E.g., Oskar Morgenstern, Oligopoly, Monopolistic Competition, and the Theory of
Games, 38 AM. ECON. REV, PAP. PROCED. 10 (1948) (discussing the relationship between
competition and game theory), as well as the significant work by John F. Nash. E.g., John
Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950) (discussing game theory). See
also Franklin Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, 20 RAND
J. ECON. 113, 113–24 (1989) (outlining a revolution in game theory); Roger B. Myerson,
Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory, 37 J. ECON LIT. 1067 (1999) (taking
a historical approach to game theory).
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under the name “imperfect competition.”76 These theories departed from
their creators’ original models in several ways. The departures that were
most relevant to competition policy were the accommodation of
differentiated products into oligopoly theory, rejection of the classical
assumption that new entry is easy and would occur whenever prices were
above cost, and game theory.
In the process oligopoly theory became more complex, depending on
assumptions about firms’ initial choices and reactions. Some explorations
were concerned with single periods, but game theory introduced the idea of
repeated cycles and a concept of equilibrium that included shared
understanding of the anticipated responses of other firms. Although Cournot
himself had assumed markets for identical products, the new oligopoly
theory also applied Cournot to differentiated products, in the process
occupying some of the space belonging to monopolistic competition.77 In
short, the new theory began to reflect in a much more robust and eventually
more testable way the manner in which firms in markets for manufactured
products actually behave. That was no small revolution in thinking about
antitrust economics.
Monopolistic Competition theory basically won by losing. Students of
oligopolistic industries began to model situations involving differentiated
products. Much of that theory also discarded Chamberlin’s assumption of
unrestricted entry and focused on markets with small numbers of firms
making differentiated products and where entry was thought to be difficult.78
The policy reactions were increasingly dominated by a belief that oligopoly
and product differentiation were more-or-less inevitable features of the
business landscape, and the best that antitrust could do is prevent monopoly
and otherwise reach peaceful coexistence with oligopolistic structures.79
76. Many of these are explored in Carl Shapiro, Theories of Oligopoly Behavior, Ch. 6,
in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUS. ORG. (Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter eds., 2007). In the same
volume, see also Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial
Organization: An Introduction and Overview, Ch. 5. John Maurice Clark acknowledged the
blending of theories already in 1940. See John M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable
Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 241 (1940) (discussing the intersection of imperfect
competition and game theory).
77. Shapiro, supra note 76. On the importance of this development, see Donald E. Farrar
& Charles F. Phillips, Jr., New Developments on the Oligopoly Front: A Comment, 67 J. POL.
ECON. 414 (1959).
78. On Chamberlin’s assumptions of easy entry, see Joe S. Bain, Structure Versus
Conduct as Indicators of Market Performance: The Chicago-School Attempts Revisited, 18
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 17, 29 (1986).
79. E.g., John M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REV.
241 (1940) (describing the conditions for “workable” as opposed to perfect competition);
Corwin D. Edwards, Can the Antitrust Law Preserve Competition?, 30 AMER. ECON. REV.

308

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 24:2

An important difference between Alfred Marshall’s image of the
economy and that of Robinson and Chamberlin was that Marshall, just as
most of the classical economists, had pictured production as consisting
mainly of undifferentiated commodities. While he allowed for differences
in quality and distribution, the Marshallian world was mainly one in which
competitors faced the same demand and competed mainly on price. By
contrast, both Robinson and Chamberlin addressed an economy that was
more industrial, more differentiated, and more oriented toward distribution
and consumers. Important differences existed between the output of one firm
and that of another. Some of these differences pertained to differential cost
structures, while others applied to product design, engineering, or
distribution methods. Further, over an intermediate or long run firms could
make strategic choices about product or production design.
The existence of these features was really not in dispute. Rather the
questions were whether and how to acknowledge them, and whether they
called for any amendments to the general insistence by classical political
economists since Adam Smith that the “invisible hand” of the market could
maximize value without government intervention.
Joseph Schumpeter’s prescient 1934 review of Joan Robinson’s
Economics of Imperfect Competition recognized the challenge her work
presented to neoliberal, non-interventionist economics.80 Schumpeter
described how thought about markets up to that time, with Cournot as an
exception, had been dominated by a model of perfect competition and an
offsetting model of “perfect monopoly.”81 Between the two, however, was
a “stretch of ground” that was regarded “as rather unsafe and incapable of
yielding determinate results.”82
Schumpeter-himself a conservativeobserved that this state of affairs was unsatisfactory because “the majority of
practical cases” lay on the ground between the two extremes.83 Further, the
two cases at the extremes “are much farther removed from reality and much
less likely to be fulfilled” than even Alfred Marshall believed.84
Schumpeter’s conclusions were ominous: the state need not intervene
in perfectly competitive markets, but these were uncommon. Pure
monopoly, also relatively rare, was subject to regulatory control. As a result,
an economy that exhibited only these two structural choices presented
PAP. PROCEED. 164 (1940) (doubting the efficacy of American antitrust policy).
80. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Robinson’s Economics of Imperfect Competition, 42 J. POL.
ECON. 249 (1934).
81. Id. at 249.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 249–50.
84. Id. at 250.
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relatively infrequent need for antitrust intervention. In the observed world,
however, the vastness of the intermediate situations called for action:
as soon as we realize the implications of imperfect competition all
presumption vanishes for some of those effects to emerge which
we used to attribute to the normal working of an economic society
which in common parlance would still be called ““competitive.”“
Our theorems about maximum satisfaction or maximum national
dividend cease to hold true and the list of cases in which collective
political action can increase both of them becomes so extended as
to make these cases the rule rather than more or less curious
exceptions.85
Speaking as an economist, he observed, “if it be part of our business to
advise on questions of economic policy, then this advice would in very many
cases have to be the exact opposite of what it was twenty years ago.”86
The Attempt to Redefine Oligopoly
Stigler, who began his career in economics in the 1930s, became
devoted to proving that Schumpeter’s assessment of the competitive
landscape was wrong.87 Rather, he stayed on the path forged by Marshall,
seeing perfect competition and monopoly as the only useful models of the
industrial economy. Already in 1937, Stigler, then a professor at Iowa State
University, complained that the recently emergent theories of imperfect
competition were receiving too much attention. They were in fact little more
than a “distracting fad” concerned more “with mathematical virtuosity than
with desirable economic policy.”88 On that point he was at least half correct:
the mathematics of oligopoly and monopolistic competition quickly became
much more technical than the Marshallian mathematics of competition and
monopoly.89
Stigler argued that oligopoly was nothing more than a set of narrow
85. Id. at 250–51.
86. Id.
87. See Craig Freedman, The Chicago School of Anti-Monopolistic Competition:
Stigler’s Scorched Earth Campaign Against Chamberlin 165–342, in IN SEARCH OF THE TWOHANDED ECONOMIST: IDEOLOGY, METHODOLOGY AND MARKETING IN ECONOMICS (Craig
Freedman ed., 2016) (discussing Stigler’s work on competition); Richard S. Schmalensee,
George Stigler’s Contribution to Economics, 85 SCAND. J. ECON. 77 (1983).
88. George J. Stigler, A Generalization of the Theory of Imperfect Competition, 19 J.
FARM ECON. 707, 708 (1937).
89. On the marginalist revolution in the late nineteenth century and the dramatic increase
in economists’ use of mathematics, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN
LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870–1970 at 39–32, 85–87 (2015).
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exceptions to the traditional theory of collusion within a perfect competition
model,90 and that monopolistic competition was nothing more than a
variation on the theory of monopoly.91 In the process he set himself up as a
fierce and lifelong champion of perfect competition and monopoly as the
only two market equilibria worthy of study.92
Cournot’s oligopoly theory was “non-cooperative,” meaning that it did
not depend on any assumptions about communicated agreement. Rather,
each firm observed the output of rivals and equated marginal cost and
marginal revenue over the remaining, or “residual,” demand. The firms
would make continuous adjustments until everyone in the market was in an
equilibrium position. That theory adapted itself to repeated iterations, or
games, to the extent that firms could observe and then predict the behavior
of others and learn from their observations. In 1984, the same year as
Easterbrook’s error cost article was published, political scientist Robert
Axelrod provided both analytic support and breadth beyond industrial
economics for this game theory in his influential book, The Evolution of
Cooperation.93
Already by mid-century, many antitrust economists and lawyers had
come to believe that, given expansion in firm size and growing market
concentration, oligopoly performance was “inevitable.”94 This was an
important premise for the 1950 amendments to §7 of the Clayton Act,95 as
well as decisions such as Brown Shoe that interpreted it. Contemporary
scholar Derek Bok saw oligopoly as one of the defining features of a

90. E.g., George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
91. E.g., George J. Stigler, Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect 131–44, in READINGS
IN INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS (C.K. Rowley ed., 1972).
92. See George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL.
ECON. 1, 17 (1957) (“[T]he concept of perfect competition has defeated its newer rivals in the
decisive area: the day-to-day work of the economic theorist.”).
93. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
94. E.g., Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 666–68 (1962). Accord
Louis B. Schwartz, New Approaches to the Control of Oligopoly, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 33–
34 (1978). See also CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC
AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 27–28, 46, 111–19 (1959) (referring to “structural oligopoly” and
recommending breakup).
95. Cellar-Kefauver Antimerger Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), (codified at 15
U.S.C. §18). See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 280–81 (1964) (citing
control of oligopoly as rationale for merger law). See Simon N. Whitney, Mergers,
Conglomerates, and Oligopolies: A Widening of Antitrust Targets, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 187
(1967); James M. Henderson & William H. Henderson, The Race to Oligopoly, 1968 DUKE
L.J. 637 (1968). For Stigler’s evaluation, see George J. Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly by
Merger, 40 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC. 23) (1950).
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changing industrial landscape.96 One offered justification of the statutory
revision was that “the country was in the midst of a new wave of mergers in
which little businesses were being absorbed in large numbers by big firms.”
As a result, “competitive, small-business industries such as textiles were
steadily being transformed by mergers into oligopolies.”97
Interestingly, the Sherman Act itself, drafted in 1890 long before
modern theories of imperfect competition were developed, addressed
behavior under the same rubric that both Marshall and the classical political
economists had-namely competition and monopoly-ignoring the territory in
between. Section 1 of the Sherman Act reached “contracts, combinations,
and conspiracies”–all practices that assume the existence of a more-or-less
explicit cartel. Section 2 of the Sherman Act is concerned with monopoly.
There is no “§1.5” focused on intermediate situations, and antitrust policy
ever since has had considerable difficulty in addressing them.98 Stigler’s
outlier theory of oligopoly, discussed below,99 was actually more consistent
with this Sherman Act approach.
Although Marshall’s Principles was published in the year that the
Sherman Act was passed, there is no evidence that any member of Congress
was familiar with it. In fact, the Sherman Act was simply reflecting the
English common law and economics of the time, which abhorred monopoly
and disliked most forms of collusion but had no theory of oligopoly or
imperfect competition.
By contrast, the Clayton Act’s “may substantially lessen competition”
formulation did not make the same distinctions. Its lack of an agreement
requirement could enable it to reach oligopoly positions that lay between the
extremes. What the Clayton Act did not include, however, was a provision
that applied directly to coordinated interaction among competitors in the
absence of an agreement or merger. The “may substantially lessen
competition” formulation in the Clayton Act occurs in three provisions: §2
96. Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics,
74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 230, 235 (1960) (noting Congress’ assumption that markets were being
changed into oligopolies via a wave of mergers).
97. Id. at 235. For a complaint that the 1950 Act did not go far enough, see Damuel R.
Reid, Antitrust and the ‘Merger-Wave’ Phenomenon: A Failure of the Public Policy, 3
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 25 (1969) (noting a substantial merger wave in the late 1960s,
after the Act was passed). For good commentary, see Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust and
Democracy: A Case Study from German Fascism (U. Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper,
No. 18-009, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3164467 [https://per
ma.cc/34SK-GUE7].
98. On the numerous difficulties that have arisen in antitrust cases, see 6 PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶1407, 1409–15, 1428–36 (4th ed.
2017).
99. See discussion infra, text at notes 109–117.
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on price discrimination,100 §3 on tying and exclusive dealing,101 and §7 on
mergers.102 Mergers that facilitated oligopoly were reachable even in the
absence of a provable agreement. As a result, after the 1950 Amendment
merger policy emerged as one, although incomplete, way of filling in the gap
that the Sherman Act had left.103
The 1950 amendments to the merger statute did implicitly recognize
imperfect competition, although in the process they also provoked an
overreaction.104 The expressed concern was not with monopoly or cartels,
but rather with rising industrial concentration itself. The statute’s
prohibitions gave no hint of limitation to either mergers that produced an
actual monopoly or those that facilitated collusion.
Further, the
concentration levels that became identified as problematic were far lower
than those that are regarded as such today. Indeed, one goal was to protect
small business from larger firms–something that could occur at any
concentration level.
Brown Shoe, the first Supreme Court decision to interpret the new
merger statute, produced a pro-enforcement error cost bias that came to be
ridiculed by people such as Robert H. Bork.105 The Brown Shoe theory was
driven by its assumption, which was that American industry was exhibiting
a “trend toward concentration.”106 This required a bias toward enforcement:
“If a merger achieving 5% control were now approved, we might be required
to approve future merger efforts by Brown’’s competitors seeking similar
market shares. The oligopoly Congress sought to avoid would then be
furthered and it would be difficult to dissolve the combinations previously
approved.”107
The Court also made clear that its opposition to industry concentration
was based on “Congress’’ fear not only of accelerated concentration of
100. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2018).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2018).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018).
103. See Bok, supra note 96, at 230 (making this point).
104. Bok, supra note 96; Herbert Hovenkamp, Derek Bok and the Merger of Law and
Economics, 21 J. L. REFORM 515, 534–35 (1988).
105. See BORK, supra note 56 at 198–216 (describing Brown Shoe as the “crash” of merger
policy).
106. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315–16, 332 (1962), citing Stigler,
Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 176, 180 (1955), https://scholars
hip.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7445&context=penn_law_review [https://pe
rma.cc/4EUT-PVNM]; S. REP. NO. 619, at 7 (1955) (discussing a need for an amendment to
the Clayton Act). The Court also relied on the legislative history. 95 CONG. REC. 11,489,
11,494, 11, 498 (1949) (remarks of Representatives Keating, Yates, and Patman); 96 CONG.
REC. 16,444 (1950) (remarks of Senators O’Mahoney and Murray).
107. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 343–44.
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economic power on economic grounds, but also of the threat to other values
a trend toward concentration was thought to pose.”108
THE ORIGINS OF THE ERROR COST FRAMEWORK
Stigler and Bork on Oligopoly
George J. Stigler had been one of the founding members of the
libertarian Mont Pelerin Society and later served for one term as its
President.109 In 1964, he published “A Theory of Oligopoly,” now a Chicago
School classic.110 His article never mentioned either Cournot or any other
established economists in the literature of oligopoly. Without saying it in so
many words, he rejected the theory of oligopoly altogether, seeing the entire
problem as one of “policing a collusive agreement, which proves to be a
problem in the theory of information.”111
Stigler’s main critique of oligopoly was, first, to reject the proposition
that any kind of collusive equilibrium, whether oligopoly or cartel, was
stable as a general matter.112 This was in fact a head on attack against the
noncooperative Cournot literature, which had proposed that stable oligopoly
equilibria existed when each firm equated its individual marginal cost and
marginal revenue over its residual demand. By contrast, in a classic cartel
each firm’s price is too high and output too low.113 Thus if one ignores rivals’
responses the Cournot equilibrium is more stable than the cartel equilibrium.
By contrast, for Stigler the firms in both situations were simply colluding,
and they would try to find ways to compete by cheating on the collusive
arrangement–that is, by producing more or charging less than a well-behaved
cartel member should.
Stigler observed that the contractual deals offered by different firms
were quite heterogeneous, even when they were selling the same product.

108. Id. at 316.
109. See Van Horn & Mirowski, supra note 40. For Stigler’s own account, see his
autobiography, GEORGE J. STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 116 (1988).
See also Past Presidents, THE MONT PERLIN SOC’Y, https://www.montpelerin.org/past-preside
nts-2/ [https://perma.cc/CUC5-XPJL] (last visited Nov. 17, 2021) (listing the Society’s roster
of past presidents, including George Stigler, 1976–1978).
110. George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
111. Id. at 44.
112. On Stigler’s other work making a similar argument, see Schmalensee, supra note 87.
113. I.e., at the cartel price each firm individually has an incentive to expand output to the
point that its own marginal cost equals its individual marginal revenue. See William L.
Holahan, Cartel Problems: Comment, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 942 (1978) (discussing issues with
cartel pricing).
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Firms competed by offering slightly different terms than someone else. This
was not because the product varied but rather because consumer information
and tastes varied. As a result, there is no such thing as a single monopoly
price.114 In fact, the “heterogeneity of purchase commitments . . . is surely
often at least as large as that of products within an industry,” and “sometimes
vastly larger.”115 What Stigler did not acknowledge is that this heterogeneity
itself led to a form of monopolistic competition in which equilibrium prices
often exceeded marginal cost and firms competed by offering different
variations in contract terms.116
Successful collusion required the cartel to offer a joint maximizing
range of variations to please customers. However, this could require a
complex agreement covering many types of transactions. As a result, cartels
often resorted to such devices as fixing market shares or output rather than
price, or by assigning particular buyers to particular sellers.117 Thus sheltered
from competition, firms could then behave more like monopolists over their
own sales.
For Stigler, the enemy of successful collusion of all kinds was the firm
that secretly cut prices or changed the product in order to steal sales from
rivals. Given the high price/cost margins of the successful cartel, the
incentive to make undetectable cuts was strong. As a result, oligopoly
pricing was hardly “inevitable,” but depended on several factors at least
some of which could be manipulated by individual firms.
The interesting thing about Stigler’s famous paper on oligopoly is that
oligopoly never really makes an appearance at all. It is in fact all about
cartels, the difficulty of managing them, and the devices that cartel managers
use to make them more stable. Tellingly, his paper never once mentioned
equilibrium. A decisive contribution of Cournot’s theory was its proof of an
equilibrium among its participants. By contrast, in an explicit cartel a stable
situation exists only to the extent that an agreement is made and enforced,
and enforcement through the judicial system is usually not available.
To the extent Stigler’s paper presented any theory of oligopoly at all, it
was in the observation that certain market structures made collusion more
plausible. Very largely the same structures, it turned out, also made Cournot

114. Stigler, supra note 110, at 45.
115. Id.
116. In fact, Stigler’s own model, presented in an appendix, showed prices above marginal
cost, but Stigler did not elaborate the point. Stigler, supra note 110, at 59–61. I am indebted
to Steve Salop for this observation. For further development, see Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Equilibrium in Product Markets with Imperfect Information, 69 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS
PROC. 339 (1979) (discussing the relationship between heterogeneity and pricing).
117. Stigler, supra note 110, at 46.
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oligopoly more plausible. Indeed, that is the way the subsequent literature
read it. For example, phenomena such as secret price cuts or deviating
collateral promises in exchange for patronage tended to undermine both
express collusion and Cournot oligopoly. For both, however, the dangers
increased as the number of firms in the market grew smaller.
Richard Posner, whose principal early contributions on oligopoly and
collusion were explicitly indebted to Stigler,118 adopted this model,
proposing that Stigler’s factors plus some additional ones be used as devices
for detecting what he termed “tacit” collusion. This referred to cartel-like
conduct for which the Sherman Act’s statutory requirements of a “contract,
combination, . . . or conspiracy” could not be met.119 That is, Posner
attempted to bring oligopoly theory within §1 of the Sherman Act by seeing
it as simply a variation of collusion. Just as Stigler, he never cited Cournot.
For antitrust purposes, he argued, oligopoly should be viewed as a real,
cooperative solution that differed from the classic cartel in that it involved
less explicit types of communication, as well as inferences that could be
drawn from a firm’s decisions about production. Forty years later, Posner
conceded that this experiment had largely failed.120
The government’s Merger Guidelines reflect Stigler’s and Posner’s
strong initial influence that gradually weakened over successive editions.
For example, the 1984 Guidelines, written during the high point of neoliberal
anti-enforcement bias, spoke of firms that “either explicitly or implicitly
coordinate their actions,” or “implicit coordination.”121 The 1992 and 2010
Merger Guidelines changed this to “coordinated interaction.”122
Posner did deviate from Stigler in one important way. He did not deny
that firms in a concentrated market could reach noncompetitive output
reductions and higher prices. He wrote, “[o]ligopolistic interdependence, in
short is inherent in the structure of certain markets. Only semantically can
118. Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21
STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1562 (1969).
119. Id. at 1562; for development, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §4.4 (6th ed. 2020). See in particular
§4.4a (discussing the debate between Richard Posner and Donald F. Turner on the subject).
On the use of these factors as evidence of a §1 conspiracy, see 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶1428–36 (4th ed. 2016).
120. See Richard A. Posner, Review of Kaplow, Competition and Price Fixing, 79
ANTITRUST L.J. 761 (2014) (reviewing LOUIS KAPLOW, COMPETITION POLICY AND PRICE
FIXING (2013)).
121. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES §§1.0, 3.11 (1984), https://www.just
ice.gov/archives/atr/1984-merger-guidelines [https://perma.cc/R3GL-E7VY].
122. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES §2.1 (1992),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1992-merger-guidelines [https://perma.cc/LVP9-X9E
G].
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it be equated with collusive price-fixing, for it is unresponsive to the
remedies appropriate in price-fixing cases. . . .”123
Posner’s biggest issue was not that he denied the existence of oligopoly
performance in concentrated industries. He did doubt, however, that there
was much that antitrust could do about it in the absence of evidence of an
agreement. The approach he suggested was to look for the practices that
produced stability and adherence and enjoin these where possible. This was
an alternative to the proposal offered by his foil Donald F. Turner, who had
embraced the oligopoly problem in the early 1960s but suggested that there
was no good solution within the contours of the existing Sherman Act.124
Turner referred to his book with Carl Kaysen, which had proposed
deconcentration legislation as a remedy.125 The theory was that breaking up
firms would lead to more players, thus making oligopoly or collusion more
difficult to maintain.
Robert Bork’s position was more extreme than either Posner’s or
Turner’s, although it was stated as a naked conclusion rather than as the
outcome of any serious analysis. He was simply not persuaded that what he
termed “non-collusive oligopolistic behavior” occurred anywhere “outside
of economics textbooks.”126 Already in the 1960s Bork agreed with the
Stigler position that the two things that antitrust policy should be concerned
about were monopoly and collusion, but not intermediate situations such as
oligopoly.127 Two decades later he was still opining that oligopoly was a
“shaky” economic theory:
The oligopoly theory that once was dominant in antitrust was
shaky even then, and I would suggest that it never did describe
conditions in the real world. It wasn’t a change in conditions that
undid the oligopoly model; it was the realization that it was
theoretically incoherent and that there was no observable market
in which its conclusions held good.128

123. Posner, supra note 118, at 1565.
124. Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962).
125. See id. at 671 n. 21 (referring to CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST
POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 266–72 (1959)).
126. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 221
(1978). See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?, 94
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 583, 612 (2018) (elaborating on Bork’s position).
127. See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division II, 75 YALE L.J. 272, 396 n.52 (1965) (arguing that oligopolists are “not
nearly as likely to restrict output as are cartels or monopolies”).
128. Robert H. Bork, The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics, 54 ANTITRUST L.J.
21, 25 (1985).
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The passage is insightful mainly because it reveals how little Bork knew
about what was going on in economics. In his mind, theories of oligopoly
were things that had preoccupied economics in the past, but no more. Even
as he was writing, however, the economics of industrial organization were
going through a theoretical and empirical revolution notable for the extent to
which models of imperfect competition including oligopoly were displacing
perfect competition as the governing framework.129
Today the rejection of Bork’s view in antitrust is robust, but the process
of rejection has taken a perverse turn to a position more like Turner’s than
that of either Stigler or Posner. Section One of the Sherman Act is not
satisfied by noncooperative oligopoly or even by conscious parallelism or
signaling content that falls short of agreement. As a result, the argument
goes, while collusion-like outcomes or conscious parallelism in markets with
many firms may be sufficiently suspicious to raise a fact issue of agreement,
the same conduct in highly concentrated markets for fungible products does
not serve to prove a Sherman Act agreement at all. Such outcomes are to be
expected simply from the structure of the market. For example, consider this
statement from a 2017 Third Circuit decision:
In non-oligopolistic markets, “[p]arallel behavior among
competitors is especially probative of price fixing because it is the
sine qua non of a price fixing conspiracy.” But in an oligopolistic
market, parallel behavior “can be a necessary fact of life,” and
“[a]ccordingly, evidence of conscious parallelism cannot alone
create a reasonable inference of a conspiracy.” Therefore, to prove
an oligopolistic conspiracy with proof of parallel behavior, that
evidence “must go beyond mere interdependence” and “be so
unusual that in the absence of an advance agreement, no
reasonable firm would have engaged in it.”130
Far from denying that oligopoly exists except in textbooks, the court is
in fact acknowledging its existence and explaining why consciously parallel
conduct does not prove an agreement. In a concentrated market firms do not
need an agreement in order to achieve cartel-like results.
The unsettling result is that §1 of the Sherman Act works least well in
the markets where it is most needed. This fact is one of the most long-lasting
and pervasive false negatives in the history of antitrust enforcement. The
tools that we have for dealing with consciously parallel behavior among
independent actors are and have always been severely limited. The one place
129. See discussion infra, text at notes 224–252.
130. Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 873 F.3d 185, 193 (3d Cir. 2017)
(quoting, inter alia, In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383 (3d Cir.
2015)).
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we can do something, even if incomplete, is with a more aggressive merger
policy that prohibits mergers that threaten to make coordinated interaction
more likely.131
Monopolistic Competition: Stigler and Friedman
Stigler’s negative reaction to monopolistic competition was as strong
as his negative reaction to oligopoly. Historically, one of the most important
differences between the theory of oligopoly and that of monopolistic
competition is that oligopoly was from the onset a theory about how markets
for identical products arrive at an equilibrium. That was one of Cournot’s
most important original contributions.
By contrast, the firms in
Chamberlin’s model were always trying to differentiate their products from
one another, leading to a “market” of people that were actually selling
different things.132 Further, in Chamberlin’s own work there was no robust
theory of market equilibrium, but only the equilibrium of a single firm.
About the best Chamberlin could produce was a concept of a “group
equilibrium” that was never very well explained.133
131. Posner acknowledged this as a partial solution to the problem. See Posner, supra note
118, at 1566 (noting why Donald Turner, the head of the Antitrust Division had supported a
prophylactic approach toward mergers:
Since mergers historically have been an important source of concentration, a
strong antimerger policy should do much to prevent new oligopolies from
emerging and loosely oligopolistic industries from becoming tightly
oligopolistic. The extraordinary stringency of the Guidelines may reflect in part
Turner’s earlier expressed view that once a market has become highly
concentrated there is little that can be done under existing law to prevent
noncompetitive, interdependent pricing.
For a good economic explanation of why we need a more prophylactic policy against
horizontal mergers to address oligopoly coordination, see Jonathan B. Baker & Joseph Farrell,
Oligopoly Coordination, Economic Analysis, and the Prophylactic Role of Horizontal Merger
Enforcement, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1985 (2020). See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Prophylactic
Merger Policy, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 45 (2018) (providing further explanation of the need for
prophylactic policy).
132. As a result, under simple assumptions a firm in monopolistic competition prices at
the tangent of its demand curve and its long average cost curve and profits will be zero. See
Steven C. Salop, Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods, 10 BELL J. ECON. 141, 145
(1979) (explaining firm prices in monopolistic competition). At that point the firm also carries
excess capacity. See Yoram Barzel, Excess Capacity in Monopolistic Competition, 78 J. POL.
ECON. 1142, 1142 (1970) (discussing excess capacity).
133. CHAMBERLIN, supra note 63, at 69: (“Monopolistic competition . . . concerns itself
not only with the problem of an individual equilibrium (the ordinary theory of monopoly), but
also with that of a group equilibrium (the adjustment of economic forces within a group of
competing monopolists, ordinarily regarded merely as a group of competitors”).
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Stigler saw this but developed an exaggerated view of its implications
for the concept of markets. It led him to doubt that Chamberlin was even
talking about goods within a single market at all. As Stigler explained it, the
Chamberlin market consisted of “fairly close substitutes,” but how close is
“close”?134 Where does one draw the line of “closeness” so as to distinguish
two firms in the same market from the situation where one firm is just inside
the market and one just outside? As Stigler observed, “[i]t is perfectly
possible, on Chamberlin’s picture of economic life, that the group contain
only one firm, or, on the contrary, that it includes all of the firms in the
economy.”135 As a result, he concluded, it seemed unlikely that one could
speak of an equilibrium in a Chamberlin model at all.136 This objection was
reflected in the work of later scholars who believed that Marshallian partial
equilibrium analysis was not really possible under monopolistic competition.
Since there was no hard-line defining market boundaries, economists should
use general equilibrium analysis and think of the market as the entire
economy.137
Picking up from Stigler, a decade later Milton Friedman continued
along the same line, querying facetiously whether bulldozers and hairpins
should be regarded as differentiated products within a single market. Once
we consider product differences as central, the idea of markets becomes
meaningless. Just as it is meaningless to speak of a “market” for bulldozers
and hairpins, so too would it be meaningless to place “two brands of
toothpaste” into the same market.138 As a result, he concluded, the
Chamberlin model for markets offers . . . no stopping place between the firm
at one extreme and general equilibrium at the other.”139
What neither Stigler nor Friedman appreciated at the time is that the
modeling and equilibrium problems could and would be solved. Further, the
precise location of market boundaries lost the importance it had had for
Marshall and earlier economists. Today, differentiated markets are modeled
134. George J. Stigler, Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect, in FIVE LECTURES ON
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 15 (1949).
135. Id. at 15.
136. Id. at 18.
137. See, e.g., ROBERT TRIFFIN, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
THEORY (1940). For an important critique, see RICHARD MARKOVITS, ECONOMICS AND THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF U.S. AND E.U. ANTITRUST LAW (2014); see also
Herbert Hovenkamp, Reimagining Antitrust: The Revisionist Work of Richard S. Markovits,
94 TEX. L. REV. 1221 (2016).
138. Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in MILTON FRIEDMAN,
ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 1, 39 (1953).
139. Id. at 39: (“[A]lthough Professor Chamberlin does not state the possibility, it is not
even clear that equilibrium is attainable: under these vague conditions price may continue to
change, and new firms may continue to enter and old firms continue to leave the ‘group.’”).
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all the time and can have stable equilibria, as literature since the 1970s has
developed.140 Even under product differentiation and easy entry, new firms
would come in until the expected profits from entry (margins multiplied by
volume, less costs) were too low. As a result, one can model the size of the
market, including the number of firms and even the range of diversity.141 The
same thing is true of oligopoly in differentiated markets.142
Stigler’s and Friedman’s critique of monopolistic competition observed
that the traditional idea of distinctive “markets” loses much of its
significance when we have to consider that products are differentiated, and
that some are more differentiated than others. At the risk of making their
claims sound frivolous, they were obsessed with the question of how far is
far, and apparently assumed that there was a natural answer that
differentiated product models somehow ignored. When Friedman queried
whether the monopolistic competition analysis would put bulldozers and
hairpins into the same market, he believed he was making a serious critique.
Both Stigler and Freidman came out of an era when the delineation of
distinctive “markets” was an essential ingredient of economic analysis.
Under more empirical analysis of differentiated producers, however, the
concept of the relevant market has become less important, and today
economists routinely assess market power without knowing or even caring
about market boundaries.
This empirical shift away from traditional market definition has
sometimes escaped notice. For example, in Ohio v. American Express the
Supreme Court held that market power could not be assessed directly in a
case involving a vertical practice but required a market definition.143 The
Court’s reasoning is not clear, but it concluded that vertical restraints “pose
no risk to competition unless the entity imposing them has market power,
which cannot be evaluated unless the Court first defines a relevant
market.”144 For that conclusion it quoted a statement by Easterbrook that
competitive harm can result from vertical arrangements “only if there is
market power.”145 Notably, Judge Easterbrook did not say that this required
a market definition. The Court was simply adopting as a matter of law a
retrograde doctrine–in this case a false negative that threatens to undermine
140. See discussion infra, text at notes 237–243.
141. E.g., Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum
Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297, 299 (1977) (examining a model reflecting the size
of market).
142. See Shapiro, supra note 76, at 334, 346.
143. Ohio v. American Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
144. Id. at 2285 n.7.
145. Frank Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.
J. 135, 160 (1984).
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rational antitrust enforcement.146
Stigler had raised two additional objections to monopolistic
competition. One was that depending on the degree of differentiation
allowed, the system would tolerate the idea of several firms being in the same
“market” even though they were “heterogeneous from the technological
viewpoint.”147 That view migrated into antitrust law just a few years later
when the Supreme Court, citing Chamberlin’s theory, decided that products
as heterogenous as cellophane and tin foil could be in the same relevant
market simply because some buyers used them interchangeably as wrapping
materials.148 Both the District Court and the Supreme Court agreed that
making one product in a monopolistically competitive market did not make
one a monopolist – “this power . . . is not the power that makes an illegal
monopoly.”149 Today the question whether technically heterogenous
products can be grouped into the same market is empirically addressable and
has been the subject of significant antitrust literature and litigation.150
Stigler’s other objection to monopolistic competition theory was that
“often, and perhaps usually, a large or dominant role is played by firms
outside the group in determining prices and profits within the group.”151 Two
products identified as in the same market could be imperfect substitutes, but
one product inside and one product just outside a market could be imperfect
substitutes as well. What Stigler did not acknowledge is that the problem of
porous boundaries arises no matter what the model of competition. To be
sure, partial equilibrium analysis employs a working assumption that
individual markets are insulated from activity that occurs outside the market,

146. See discussion infra, text at notes 237–243.
147. Stigler, supra note 134, at 15.
148. United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956)
(“cellophane”) (“[W]e have monopolistic competition in every nonstandardized commodity
with each manufacturer having power over the price and production of his own product”
(citing Chamberlin, supra note 63, Ch. 4)). For the district court’s lengthy discussion, see
118 F. Supp. 41, 51–52 (D. Del. 1953). See also United States v. Continental Can Co., 378
U.S. 441, 453–55 (1964) (lumping metal cans and glass bottles into a single market for merger
analysis; noting extent to which customers switched between them).
149. Du Pont, 351 U.S. at 393 (“[O]ne can theorize that we have monopolistic competition
in every nonstandardized commodity with each manufacturer having power over the price
and production of his own product. However, this power . . . is not the power that makes an
illegal monopoly.”).
150. 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶539 (5th ed.
2021). It has also raised the issue of whether market distinguishing intellectual property rights
such as trademarks can form the basis of market definition. P. Sean Morris, Trademarks as
Sources of Market Power: Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation, 35 J. L. & COM. 163
(2017).
151. Stigler, supra note 134, at 15.
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and vice-versa, but no one really believes that this is true as a matter of fact.152
The porosity of boundaries is testable, however, and the implications
are relevant to policy making. All markets have porous boundaries, but
porosity is a question of degree. For example, suppose that in response to an
automobile price increase of 5%, one customer in 1000 substitutes to some
other product such as bicycles, walking shoes, or subway tickets. That
market would undoubtedly be considered well defined, notwithstanding that
0.1% of customers cross the boundary line in response to a price increase.
In retrospect, Stigler’s and Friedman’s resistance to monopolistic
competition derived from a notion of markets that depended on physical
similarities among products. In order to deal with the problem of
monopolistic competition economically, the inter-competitiveness of
individual firms (cross-elasticity of substitution) had to be quantified.
Physical similarity is one kind of evidence of that, but the ultimate test is the
extent to which inter-product demand shifts in response to price change can
hold a firm’s output close to its cost. A pencil and a fountain pen are not in
the same market because they look somewhat alike or perform overlapping
functions, but rather because people will substitute from one to the other as
their relative prices change.
A market’s size is a function of how high above cost a price must be
before excessive substitution will result. Since the 1970s antitrust policy
makers have answered that question with the “hypothetical monopolist”
test.153 The test assumes measurable amounts of differentiation, which is the
inverse of the cross-elasticity of substitution of supply or demand as between
two products.154 For example, if the price of bulldozers increases by 5%,
which is a common assumption for the size of the price increase, how many
customers will switch to hairpins? And would that be enough to make the
bulldozer increase unprofitable? We could perform the same test with two
brands of toothpaste, although with a different result, and we would have

152. For example, see Oliver E. Williamson’s concession in his well-known paper on
antitrust economies that partial equilibrium analysis suffers from this “defect,” and as a result
“[c]ertain economic effects may . . . go undetected.” Importantly, he was speaking of
undifferentiated markets. Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The
Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 23 (1968).
153. See Gregory J. Werden, The History of Antitrust Market Delineation, 76 MARQ. L.
REV. 123, 187 (1992), who traces the origin of the test to PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
347 (1978). See also Kenneth D. Boyer, Is There a Principle for Defining Industries?, 50 S.
ECON. J. 761 (1984) (defining market as “ideal collusive group”).
154. Michael Spence, Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition, 43
REV. ECON. STUD. 217 (1976).
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provided answers for both of Friedman’s examples.155 With good data and a
fixed assumption about how much of a price increase we want to tolerate, a
differentiated market can have identifiable boundaries.156 So the questions
Friedman was asking in the 1950s are readily answerable today, analytically
and also empirically, if the relevant information is available. Monopolistic
competition has migrated from a phenomenon thought to be untestable to
one that is routinely and robustly tested.
To illustrate, if the market power of a bicycle manufacturer such as
Schwinn were being investigated, we might hypothesize a price increase of
a given magnitude, say 10% above cost, and query how many sales Schwinn
would lose. Suppose it lost 100,000 sales but that 60,000 of these went to
bicycle seller Giant, while Trek and Fuji received 15,000 each and the
remaining sales went elsewhere. If we were evaluating a merger, we might
conclude that a merger between Schwinn and Giant should be challenged,
but not necessarily one between Schwinn and Trek. After a Schwinn/Giant
merger, many of the sales that Schwinn lost from a price increase would be
recaptured, making a formerly unprofitable price increase profitable.
In any event, Stigler was putting the cart in front of the horse. Already
in 1890 Alfred Marshall had developed partial equilibrium analysis as a tool
for carving out groups of similar goods for analysis into a single “market.”
The idea that the goods inside the grouping were perfect competitors and that
they were completely insulated from goods outside the grouping was an
important working assumption, but it was no more than that. Marshall
himself realized that this was a construct for the purpose of modeling. As he
acknowledged, the forces of competition across the entire economy are
incomprehensibly broad. As a result,
it is best to take a few at a time; and to work out a number of partial
solutions as auxiliaries to our main study. Thus we begin by
isolating the primary relations of supply, demand and price in
regard to a particular commodity. We reduce to inaction all other
forces by the phrase “other things being equal”: we do not suppose
that they are inert, but for the time we ignore their activity. This
scientific device is a great deal older than science: it is the method
by which, consciously or unconsciously, sensible men have dealt
from time immemorial with every difficult problem of ordinary

155. See discussion supra, text at notes 138–139.
156. On use of the hypothetical monopolist (or cartel) test to delineate a market’s
boundaries, see 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶530 (5th
ed. 2021). See also Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, A Practical Guide to the
Hypothetical Monopolist Test for Market Definition, 4 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 1031 (2008).
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life.157
Stigler was attempting to turn an important Chamberlin insight about
the micro-economy into a weakness. Indeed, today the theoretical and
empirical ability to quantify the degree to which close substitutes compete
with each other has become an important tool of antitrust analysis.158
Further, the question of where the boundary of a “market” is does more harm
than good. For this reason, “direct” measures of market power from residual
demand elasticities do not require a market definition.159
For Stigler, the theory of monopolistic competition did not permit a
conception of a market with a multifirm equilibrium. As a result, it was no
more than a special case of monopoly:
The general contribution of the theory of monopolistic
competition . . . has led to reorientation and refinement of our
thinking on monopoly. We are now more careful to pay attention
to the logical niceties of definitions of industries and commodities.
We are now more careful to apply monopoly theory where it is
appropriate. The importance of the trademark and of advertising,
and the need for study of product structure and evolution, have
become more generally recognized.160
Stigler did not appreciate the very real problems about the modern
economy that the model of monopolistic competition was much better at
addressing. For example, under the theory of perfect competition that Stigler
favored, the cross-elasticity of substitution (whether of demand or supply)
between two goods in the same market is infinitely high, while that of a good
inside the market and another good outside the market is zero. Historically,
Cournot theory made the same assumption; a firm considered the output of
firms making the “same” product in estimating its own residual demand, but
not the output of firms that made something different.
The theory of monopolistic competition challenged this view by
positing an economy in which the cross elasticity of substitution between
two goods falls between these extremes and varies from one pairing to
another. In the process it modelled an economy much more like the one we
actually live in. Goods have closer and more remote substitutes. For
example, a Toyota Corolla may be an imperfect substitute for both a
Chevrolet Malibu and a Jaguar XE, but the elasticity of substitution is very
157. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, xiv (8th ed. 1920) (emphasis added).
158. See discussion infra, text at notes 234–239.
159. See 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶521 (5th ed.
2021).
160. George J. Stigler, Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect, in FIVE LECTURES ON
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 144 (1949).
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likely much different. The obvious questions about such observations are
whether 1) they are provably true; and 2) whether there are any testable
policy implications. On the second point, we might define a “market” that
includes all three vehicles because all compete to some degree. Or we might
define an alternative market for, say, “standard” (as opposed to luxury)
automobiles, that excludes the Jaguar. Today we have tools for doing that,
but using them still requires a decision about just how much substitution
must occur before two goods will be placed into the same market.
When products are differentiated any antitrust market definition is
always strictly wrong. To the extent it groups differentiated goods into the
same market it tends to understate power by treating as perfectly competitive
things that are not so. To the extent it excludes imperfect substitutes it tends
to exaggerate power because it treats such goods as if they do not compete
at all.
Stigler conceded the descriptive fact of differentiation, using the New
York housing market as an example.161 The available offerings ranged from
“incredible estates to unbelievable slums,” randomly distributed. “Every
unit is unique in a rigorous technological sense. . . .”162 He observed that
using such observations made it difficult to identify “markets” at all. This
indeterminate concept of the market meant for Stigler that monopolistic
competition allowed no conception of an equilibrium.
That observation was crucial for Stigler’s critique because he believed
that the theory of monopolistic competition made it impossible to speak
sensibly about “markets” at all.163 Stigler did not pursue this observation into
antitrust, where it might have permitted a finding of “monopoly” on much
narrower markets, even single brand markets in some cases.164
161. Id. at 131.
162. Id. at 132.
163. Id. at 144. He added:
We are now more careful to pay attention to the logical niceties of definitions of
industries and commodities. We are now more careful to apply monopoly theory
where it is appropriate. The importance of the trademark and of advertising, and
the need for study of product structure and evolution, have become more
generally recognized. These and other improvements may seem disappointing to
the hopeful proposers of a proud new theory, but they should not be. This is the
way sciences grow. One of the prominent lessons of the history of human thought
is that new ideas do not lead to the abandonment of the previous heritage; the
new ideas are swallowed up by the existing corpus, which is thereafter a little
different. And sometimes a little better.
164. E.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 476, n.22 (1992)
(permitting single brand market, noting relevance of monopolistic competition); Epic Games,
Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 3d 817, 837 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (speaking of monopolistic
competition in addressing claims of a single-brand market). Chamberlin anticipated some of
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Stigler then offered an evaluation of monopolistic competition’s
contribution to economic science, similar to Friedman’s positivistic
approach to economics a decade later:
The purpose of the study of economics is to permit us to make
predictions about the behavior of economic phenomena under
specified conditions. The sole test of the usefulness of an
economic theory is the concordance between its predictions and
the observable course of events. Often a theory is criticized or
rejected because its assumptions are ‘‘unrealistic’’. Granting for
a moment that this charge has meaning, it burdens theory with an
additional function, that of description.
This is a most
unreasonable burden to place upon a theory: the role of description
is to particularize, while the role of theory is to generalize - to
disregard an infinite number of differences and capture the
important common element in different phenomena.165
This defense of testability as the key to science did not so much
anticipate Friedman as reflect both Stigler’s and Friedman’s experiences in
the Mont Pelerin society, where Friedman in particular was very taken with
the scientific positivism of fellow Mont Pelerin member Karl Popper.166
To Stigler, the theory of monopolistic competition was largely useless
to economic science. While it could tell descriptive stories about such
phenomena as the diversified New York housing market, it could not offer
useful predictions. He ignored monopolistic competition in his otherwise
important book on price theory.167
Stigler failed to foresee that given adequate data even the highly
differentiated New York City housing market could be subjected to empirical
competitive analysis. It could predict, for example, that a merger of two
similar and adjacent high rise apartment buildings in New York would have
a more measurable impact on prices than a merger of one apartment building
and one single family mansion a half mile away. In fact, today that kind of
merger analysis is the rule rather than the exception.168 It is based on the
simple premise that the amount of product differentiation between two goods
is testable and can yield useful predictions about the impact of such
this. See Edward H. Chamberlin, Product Heterogeneity and Public Policy, 40 AM. ECON.
REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 85 (1950) (anticipating existence of monopolies in single brand
markets).
165. GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 23 (3d ed. 1966).
166. See ANGUS BURGIN, THE GREAT PERSUASION: REINVENTING FREE MARKETS SINCE
THE DEPRESSION 160 (2012) (describing relationship between Friedman and Popper).
167. STIGLER, supra note 165.
168. See 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶914 (4th ed.
2018) (describing unilateral post-merger price increases in product differentiated markets).
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substitution on price.169
Friedman’s well known essay on positive economics also argued that
the value of an economic theory is its testability, not its descriptive
verisimilitude.170 Indeed, he is largely credited with importing positivistic
scientific methodology into economics.171 As with Stigler, he was
particularly critical of monopolistic competition theory because he believed
it provided no mechanism for assessing how far apart in product space two
products must be before they should be placed in different markets.172 He
elaborated:
The deficiencies of the theory are revealed most clearly in its
treatment of, or inability to treat, problems involving groups of
firms-Marshallian “industries.” So long as it is insisted that,
differentiation of product is essential - and it is the distinguishing
feature of the theory that it does insist on this point - the definition
of an industry in terms of firms producing an identical product
cannot be used. By that definition each firm is a separate industry.
Definition in terms of “close” substitutes or a “substantial” gap in
cross-elasticities evades the issue, introduces fuzziness and
undefinable terms into the abstract model where they have no
place, and serves only to make the theory analytically
meaningless. . . .173
As a result, he concluded:
“It is therefore incompetent to contribute to the analysis of a host of
important problems: the one extreme is too narrow to be of great interest; the
other, too broad to permit meaningful generalizations.”174

169. E.g., Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Estimating the Residual Demand
Curve Facing a Single Firm, 6 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 283 (1988) (quantifying product
differentiation as the inverse of the cross elasticity of demand as between two brands; applying
it to the differentiated beer industry).
170. MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in MILTON FRIEDMAN,
ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 1, 1–47 (1953).
171. See William J. Frazer, Jr. & Lawrence A. Boland, An Essay on the Foundations of
Friedman’s Methodology, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 129 (1983) (alluding in part to Friedman’s use
of positivistic scientific methodology into economics). See also Lawrence A. Boland, Current
View on Economic Positivism, in COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC THOUGHT 88,
88 (David Greenaway et al ed., 1991) (emphasizing the pervasiveness of economic
positivism).
172. See, e.g, FRIEDMAN, supra note 170, at 39 n.34 (citing R. L. Bishop, Elasticities,
Cross-Elasticities, and Market Relationships, 42 AM. ECON. REV. 779 (1952)) (rejecting
attempts to classify elasticity pairs as “large” or “small” and define markets on that basis).
173. FRIEDMAN, Methodology, supra note 138, at 38.
174. FRIEDMAN, Methodology, supra note 138, at 38.
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Given the empirical revolution that occurred in the 1970s and after,
today Stigler’s and Friedman’s comments seem quaint, dated, and in all
events wrong. Limited by the theory and econometric tools of their day,
however, the theory of monopolistic competition offered little in the way of
testable results. Paul Samuelson’s observation in 1967 that monopolistic
competition was not yet testable but probably could be was far more realistic
as of that time.175 He anticipated the very significant developments in
testability of monopolistic competition that subsequently occurred.176
Markets and Equilibrium Under Imperfect Competition
Both Stigler and Friedman depicted equilibrium as easy and intuitive
for perfectly competitive markets, but not for differentiated ones. In addition
to being wrong about monopolistic competition, they also seriously
understated the difficulties that economists including Marshall had
encountered in developing a usable theory of equilibrium even for
undifferentiated industries. For Marshall, the fly in the ointment was fixed
costs. Under perfect competition, which Marshall assumed, prices will be
driven to marginal costs, without enough remaining to cover fixed costs.
Further, fixed costs entail that per unit costs that decline as output increases.
So why does a single firm that becomes larger than the others not end up
taking over the entire market, leading to permanent monopoly? This fixedcost controversy haunted not only the economics literature but also antitrust
policy in its early years, leading to such things as the “ruinous competition”
defense to collusion in industries with high fixed costs. The argument was
that in such industries as the railroads competition would drive prices below
total costs and only collusion or merger would save them. Competition
would not work in industries with high fixed costs. This battle raged in
economics from the beginning of the twentieth century until the 1930s.177
Marshall himself had addressed the problem by developing the
essentially biological idea of the “representative” firm, which was similar to
175. Paul A. Samuelson, The Monopolistic Competition Revolution, in MONOPOLISTIC
COMPETITION THEORY, 105, 108 n.5 (Robert E. Kuenne ed., 1967).
176. See discussion infra, text at notes 235–239; e.g, Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E.
Stieglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297
(1977); see Steven Brakman & Ben J. Heijdra, Introduction to THE MONOPOLISTIC
REVOLUTION IN RETROSPECT (Steven Brakman & Ben J. Heijdra eds., 2002) (discussing in
part the monopolistic competition revolution started by Dixit and Stieglitz); John C. Panzar
& James N. Rosse, Testing for “Monopoly” Equilibrium, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 443 (1987)
(developing testable models of monopolistic competition).
177. The controversy is recounted in HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN
LAW, 1836–1937, at 308–22 (1991).
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but also distinctive from other firms in the market.178 Marshall used the
analogy of the representative tree in a forest. Some trees are younger and
still growing. Others are mature and about to die. As a result, the identity
of the representative tree changes over time while the forest as a whole
always retains its general characteristics. Because of this natural life cycle,
no one acquires a permanent monopoly. Individuals move gradually into
their strongest positions and then gradually fade out until they die.
While the “representative” firm idea failed as a durable economic
concept, Marshall did point the debate in one unalterable direction: the way
to get a stable equilibrium at the market level is to uncover relevant
differences among firms. Marshall’s biological cycling story was one, but
others resorted to other differentiating attributes, including spatial
separation,179 changing costs,180 and price discrimination181 as well as product
differentiation.182
The theory of monopolistic competition provided a solution that largely
ended the debate: equilibrium is possible because individual firms in fact
face slightly different demand curves. They are able to survive even with
fixed costs because their customer base is not quite the same as the customer
base of their rivals. As a result, equilibrium is possible even in the presence
of fixed costs and prices higher than marginal cost.183
The Meaning and Scope of Entry Barriers
The anti-enforcement version of the error-cost theory depended
strongly on one very general assumption that had always guided classical
economics: entry by new firms would discipline any existing firm’s attempt
to charge more than a competitive price. Judge Easterbrook expressed it in
his opening declaration that “[m]onopoly is self-destructive. Monopoly

178. The theory, as well as subsequent refinements by Arthur C. Pigou and Ronald Coase,
is explored further in Herbert Hovenkamp, Coase, Institutionalism, and the Origins of Law
and Economics, 86 IND. L.J. 499, 537–39 (2011).
179. E.g., Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41 (1929) (exploring
differential consumer preferences under spatial dispersion); Abba P. Lerner & Hans W.
Singer, Some Notes on Duopoly and Spatial Competition, 45 J. POL. ECON. 145 (1937)
(exploring the effects of special dispersion on competition).
180. Arthur C. Pigou, An Analysis of Supply, 38 ECON. J. 238 (1928) (explaining that firms
whose marginal costs are higher than industry supply price will shrink while those whose
marginal costs are lower will grow).
181. JOHN M. CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS (1923).
182. CHAMBERLIN, supra note 63.
183. For good discussion of the role of monopolistic competition in settling the fixed cost
controversy, see MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 375–79 (5th ed. 1996).
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prices eventually attract entry.”184 He acknowledged that in some situations
entry might be a “long time coming,” but that should not obscure the main
point–markets discipline monopoly pricing by bringing in new sellers.185 An
important premise of the error cost jurisprudence is that entry barriers are
generally low.186
Prior to the 1930s, economists did not think systematically about the
conditions encouraging or discouraging market entry. Alfred Marshall never
mentioned them in the nearly 1000 pages of his Principles.187 He assumed
that entry was easy and would occur as long as profits were anticipated.
Entry would stop when there was no remaining margin between anticipated
prices and anticipated costs, and only for that long. By contrast, monopoly
was usually analyzed on the assumption that entry was impossible, or simply
not in prospect. When the classical political economists became angry about
entry barriers it was almost always about government-created restrictions
such as patents or other exclusive rights, corporate charters, or occupational
licensing restrictions.188 In those cases they usually associated entry
restraints with monopoly.189
These assumptions largely held true for Joan Robinson and Edward
Chamberlin as well. The theory of monopolistic competition assumed easy
entry. Joan Robinson’s Economics of Imperfect Competition explicitly
acknowledged that perfect competition required easy entry, but the only
entry barriers she ever mentioned were government restrictions.190 In one
prescient footnote she acknowledged that the study of the “conditions
influencing the entry of new firms” is “an interesting and largely unexplored
field of inquiry.”191
The idea of economic barriers to market entry other than explicit public
or private restrictions appeared in the antitrust case law before it was
systematized by economists. As early as its 1911 American Tobacco
184. Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 2.
185. Id.
186. See Bryan & Hovenkamp, supra note 51 (addressing concerns in competition and
innovation as a result of startup acquisitions).
187. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (8th ed. 1920). The only reference to
new entry was in his preface, and described industries that “offer[] an open field for new firms
which rise to the first rank, and perhaps after a time decay. . . .” Id. at xiii.
188. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial
Organization, 68 TEX. L. REV. 105, 149–50 (1989) (discussing frustration of classical
economists with government-based market restrictions).
189. Id; Lawrence M. Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890–
1910: A Legal and Social Study, 53 CAL. L. REV. 487, 494–502 (1965).
190. See, e.g., JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 93, 250, 283–
84 (2d ed. 1969).
191. Id. at 92 n.1.
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decision, the Supreme Court criticized aggregations of capital that served “as
perpetual barriers to the entry of others into the tobacco trade.”192 In a
pessimistic and often exaggerated book published in 1936, Columbia
University economist Arthur R. Burns frequently lamented the fact that entry
into some markets was difficult and costly, in part because prospective
entrants had to consider the fact that in response to their own entry prices
would fall even further. As a result, they were inclined to stay away.193
The more centrist Harvard School economist Joe S. Bain studied the
issue systematically in the 1950s and 1960s and remains the most significant
theoretician of the subject. He developed an influential and enforcementneutral definition of entry barriers that is dominant to this day. An entry
barrier is some factor that excludes new entrants from a market even as
monopoly profits are being earned. More technically, entry barriers measure
“the degree to which established firms can elevate their selling prices above
minimal average costs while forestalling entry.”194 That definition is
enforcement-neutral because it makes no a priori judgment about the quality
or necessity of a barrier to entry in a particular case but is dedicated only to
determining empirically whether a barrier exists. Bain found commonly
given factors such as economies of scale and fixed costs to be entry
barriers,195 but he also found barriers in product differentiation and vertical
integration.196 Further, these barriers excluded even equally efficient rivals.
The first set of merger guidelines, issued by the Justice Department in 1968,
emphasized the point about vertical integration. They concluded that large
vertical mergers “will usually raise entry barriers or disadvantage
192. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 183, 190 (1911). See also
United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 456–57 (1920) (describing how the tobacco
trust excluded new entrants by buying firms up and shutting them down); United States v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 226 F. 62, 75 (W.D.N.Y. 1915) (same; repeated acquisitions). Under
state antitrust law, see, e.g., Needles v. Bishop & Babock Co., 14 Ohio Dec. 445, 1904 WL
1209 (Ohio C.P. 1904) (exclusionary agreement covering plumbing supplies).
193. ARTHUR ROBERT BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION: A STUDY OF THE EVOLUTION
OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 141, 409, 470 (1936).
194. JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 268 (1968). See also JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS
TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES (1956) (first introducing this definition of entry barriers).
195. Bain’s position was basically that economies of scale were an entry barrier, and that
plant size in many industries was much greater than needed to attain all available economies.
See JOE S. BAIN, PRICING, DISTRIBUTION AND EMPLOYMENT 178–79 (1948) (discussing factors
that act as barriers to competitive markets).
196. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION, supra note 194, at 142–43, 212. On Bain and
vertical integration in particular, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration
and the Business Firm: 1880–1960, 95 IOWA L. REV. 863 (2010). On the perceived
relationship between vertical integration and monopolistic competition, see Morris A.
Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARV. L. REV. 27 (1949).
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competitors to an extent not accounted for by, and wholly disproportionate
to, such economies as may result from the merger.”197
In his quest to shore up perfect competition models, Stigler built an antienforcement bias into his alternative definition of an entry barrier: an entry
barrier is “a cost of producing (at some or every rate of output) which must
be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms
already in the industry.”198
The Stigler definition’s anti-enforcement bias is that it tends to reward
incumbents if the entry risk attaches to novelty or small size. Because every
firm was once new and small, these were costs that it also had to overcome.
For example, a firm that already has a well-recognized brand name faces a
lower cost of maintaining consumer awareness or growing new business than
a new and unknown firm. As a result, the new firm will have to spend
resources acquiring name recognition that the established firm does not.
Economies of scale operate the same way. A firm that is entering a new
market starts out at a low level of output, which will give it higher unit
production costs until it gets its output up. During that early period it will
operate at a cost disadvantage to an established larger firm. Because all firms
had to encounter these costs when they entered, they did not count as entry
barriers under Stigler’s definition.
One defense offered for Stigler’s position is that it attempts to
distinguish between desirable and undesirable entry barriers. There is
nothing inherently undesirable about name brand recognition or economies
of scale. But this loses sight of an important point, which is that antitrust
does not condemn entry barriers as such. Rather, they are simply a
mechanism for considering whether the durable exercise of monopoly power
is possible. The defendant must still have engaged in a collusive or
exclusionary practice.199
For example, suppose the fear in a market is oligopoly pricing among
three large firms with significant fixed costs and scale economies. It is
hardly useful to point out that economies of scale are not a qualifying barrier
to entry, so no need to worry. To the contrary, in this case the economies of
197. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES 9–10 (1968), available at http://ww
w.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/11247.pdf. [https://perma.cc/CB57-N4JT].
198. GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968). On the relative
merits of alternative definitions, see Dennis W. Carlton, Barriers to Entry, 1 ISSUES IN
COMPETITION L. & POL. 601 (2008).
199. For this reason, some prominent economists prefer the Bain definition. See, e.g.,
Richard Schmalensee, Sunk Costs and Antitrust Barriers to Entry, 94 AM. ECON. REV., PAPER
& PROC. 471, 474 (2004) (concluding that “[t]he Stigler definition has no useful role to play
in analysis of the ability of entry to force post-merger price reductions. All this is broadly
consistent with the Bain definition. . . .”).
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scale create the protected space in which the three large firms can coordinate
their pricing without worrying about new entry. The price coordination, not
the scale economies, is the appropriate enforcement target.
Bain and Stigler both wrote prior to the rise of a significant economic
theory of networks and network externalities, but the same argument applies
there. One of the most important entry barriers in digital network platforms
is a large installed basis.200 “Direct” network effects imply that the network
is more valuable to users as their number increases. “Indirect” network
effects imply that the network is more valuable on one side as the number of
participants on the other side increases. The Uber ride hailing app is an
example that involves both types of externalities. Uber becomes more
valuable as the number of drivers increases, but the increase in drivers will
also provoke an increase in riders. As a result, a large, well established ride
hailing network will have a significant advantage over a new network trying
to break into the market.201
Under the Bainian definition these network effects would be an entry
barrier if the result was that a large well-established network could earn
returns above the competitive level while yet deterring a new entrant. By
contrast, under the Stigler definition we would have to conclude that entry
barriers were lacking because the new network would have to incur the same
costs that the incumbent had to incur when it first entered the market.
The early to mid-eighties, when “The Limits of Antitrust” was written,
was the high point of entry barrier skepticism. Prominent economists at the
time were arguing that entry possibilities could alleviate many of our
concerns about monopoly, even in public utility and other natural monopoly
markets that were thought to have room for only a single firm. Firms could
still be made to compete to be that firm if the state simply set up suitable
200. See, e.g, Steven C. Salop, Dominant Digital Platforms: Is Antitrust Up to the Task?,
130 YALE L.J. FORUM 563 (2021) (examining exclusionary tactics by the dominant platforms);
Peter Lee, Innovation Consolidation, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 967 (2020) (arguing that
commercializing patented technologies leads to consolidation). See also Gregory J. Werden,
Network Effects and Conditions of Entry: Lessons from the Microsoft Case, 69 ANTITRUST
L.J. 87 (2001) (assessing how network effects can present a barrier to entry).
201. The phenomenon has been noted in the antitrust case law. See SC Innovations, Inc.
v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. 18-cv-07440-JCS, 2020 WL 2097611 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2020)
(speaking of the “ride-hailing market’s barriers to entry—in particular, network effects
caused by passengers preferring a platform with a large supply of drivers and drivers
preferring a platform with a large supply of passengers. . . .”). In general, network effects
exclude entry to the extent that significant product differentiation is impossible, as it might
well be for ride-hailing services. Where significant differentiation is possible–say, for
Facebook or another social networking site–then new entry can occur. See Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, 130 YALE L.J. 1952, 1996–2000 (2021)
(discussing market dynamics that lead to high user bases for tech platforms).
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auctions. For example, if delivery of cable television is a natural monopoly,
a bidding competition could be designed to select the carrier, and the winning
bid would be a competitive price.202 In their 1982 book on Contestable
Markets203 Baumol, Panzar, and Willig proclaimed contestable market
theory to be an “uprising” in industrial organization economics.204
The theory of contestable markets made important contributions to our
knowledge about industry structure in markets with very high and
nonrecoverable fixed costs. However, it was never an uprising, and the
economy has never yet experienced widespread abandonment of regulation
of natural monopolies in favor of franchise bidding to be the monopolist.205
Easterbrook incorporated the Stigler definition of entry barriers into his
error cost analysis, defining entry barriers as “costs borne by the new firms
that were not borne by the existing ones. . . .”206 By using this definition he
was able to propose a “filter,” which is that if a practice has persisted for a
significant length of time–he suggested five years–and the firms have not
“substantially lost market position,” then the challenge should be
dismissed.207 Interestingly, more centrist Harvard School scholars Areeda
and Turner suggested the virtually opposite presumption, which also never
became law. As part of their limited proposal for “no fault” monopolization,
they argued that monopoly that had persisted at least five years should be
challenged, with breakup as a remedy, without proof of an exclusionary
practice.208
202. E.g., Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968) (arguing
that traditional understandings of competition have led to incorrect analyses of the asserted
relationship between market concentration and competition).
203. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY
STRUCTURE (1982). For pushback, see Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural
Monopolies – In General and With Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73 (1976) and Joseph
E. Stiglitz, Technological Change, Sunk Costs, and Competition 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECON. ACTIVITY 883 (1987), https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/technological-changesunk-costs-and-competition/ [https://perma.cc/2VE2-FK4Z].
204. See William J. Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry
Structure, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1982) (asserting that a description such as “uprising” is more
indicative of the dynamics of contestable markets).
205. The theory exhibited some important conceptual flaws. For example, it required an
assumption of constant returns to scale, which meant that there could not be monopoly in the
first place. See generally Martin L. Weitzman, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the
Theory of Industry Structure: Comment, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 486 (1983) (discussing
application of the concept of contestability).
206. Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 33.
207. Id.
208. 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶623c (1978). I have kept
the original Areeda-Turner Proposal intact for purposes of reference, but with my own
objections. 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶638d (5th ed.
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In any event, neither presumption is a good idea. Economies of scale
and network effects do not work that way. Under constant technology they
can be very durable, lasting significantly longer than five years. A large
firm, or a firm with a large installed base, could retain a significant advantage
over new entrants into the indefinite future, but the Easterbrook rule would
effectively insulate it from a rule of reason antitrust offense. Every
monopolist or cartel would love to be able to take advantage of a rule that
legalized it after five years of operation without new entry. By contrast, the
Areeda-Turner proposal would presume that long resistance to entry signals
competitive harm. But it could as easily show efficient firm behavior in a
market with substantial entry impediments. The better rule for entry barriers
is that they be enforcement neutral. That is, they make durable monopoly
possible but exclusionary practices must still be proven.
Efficiencies and the Welfare-Tradeoff Model
The welfare-tradeoff model of antitrust analysis, championed by Oliver
Williamson and later popularized by Robert Bork, purported to evaluate a
merger or other antirust practice by comparing its welfare losses against its
efficiency benefits, or cost savings. This model dominated during the 1970s
and early 1980s when the focus of antitrust policy was less on achieving high
output and more on producing profits.
In a well-known paper on efficiency-creating mergers Williamson
analyzed the problem using the figure below.209 It illustrates a merger that
produces a deadweight loss of A1 and cost savings of A2. That deadweight
loss estimate, it should be noted, represents the minimum estimate that has
been used to estimate the social cost of monopoly.210 In Williamson’s model,
if the cost savings rectangle (reduced cost per unit times output) is larger
than the deadweight loss triangle the merger is efficient. Williamson
observed that this was a partial equilibrium model,211 and he acknowledged
that it was isolating one sector out of the economy.212 However, the particular
partial equilibrium model that he was illustrating was that of a monopoly–
more precisely, of a merger that carried a market from competition to
monopoly.
2021).
209. Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58
AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968). See BORK, supra note 56, at 21, 107 (showing a figure resembling
Williamson’s).
210. See discussion supra, text at notes 44–45.
211. Williamson, supra note 209, at 21.
212. Id.
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The distinctive feature of a monopoly is that both the cost savings and
the welfare loss are spread across the same market. In the case of monopoly,
that means they are also spread across a single firm. The same thing is true
of unilateral effects mergers, where only the merging parties experience the
price increase.213 However, these merger effects were not yet known at the
time Williamson was writing and he did not address them. The figure
assumes that both the deadweight losses and the cost savings reflect the price
effects and efficiency effects of a single firm.
While a merger to monopoly would be unlawful, the vast majority of
mergers challenged on collusion-facilitating grounds fall far short of that.
Further, when collusion or other coordinated behavior occurs, it typically
permits all firms in the market to raise their price. That clearly applies to
cartel members, but even nonmembers will be able to ride up on the cartel
price.214 In the orthodox example, a merger that reduces a market from, say,
five to four firms, will enable all four to increase their prices. The efficiency
gains from a merger, by contrast, are productive efficiency gains that
typically accrue only to the post-merger firm itself.
213. See DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 28, at §6 (explaining that “[a] merger between firms
selling differentiated products may diminish competition by enabling the merged firm to
profit by unilaterally raising the price of one or both products above the pre-merger level”).
214. This gives rise to the theory of “umbrella” pricing, which considers whether firms
who purchase from competitors of a cartel should have standing to sue the cartel when the
competitors are able to ride their own prices up on the cartel price increase. See PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 347 (5th ed. 2021).
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Consider what happens in the case of a merger that creates a postmerger firm with a market share in the range of 30%-40%. Under the current
Merger Guidelines,215 many collusion facilitating mergers in that range could
be challenged. For example, suppose a pre-merger market has firms of
A=40%, B=30%, C=15%, and D=15%. A merger of C and D would yield a
market with a post-merger HHI of 3400,216 and an HHI increase of 450, very
far above the threshold for presumptive challenge.217 The higher prices will
occur in the entire market–that is, both the merging firm and its rivals will
reduce output and increase their prices. However, the increased efficiencies
would ordinarily be specific to the firm, whose output accounts for only 30%
of the market. In this case, the welfare losses that result could be more than
three times larger than Williamson’s estimate. Coupled with the fact that the
welfare-tradeoff model approves mergers even when output is lower (from
Q1 to Q2 in the figure) and prices are higher as a result, the model injected a
strong anti-enforcement bias into merger law that served to protect output
reducing mergers. Further, neither Williamson nor Bork explained how
practices that reduced output so significantly could yet be efficient.218
The government’s 1984 Merger Guidelines contained a generous
accommodation of efficiencies without limitation. They required in a brief
statement only that efficiencies be established by clear and convincing
evidence.219 Subsequent editions of the Guidelines gradually moved back to
a more demanding position. The 1992 Guidelines added to this that the
government would not challenge a merger “reasonably necessary to achieve
significant net efficiencies.”220 In 1997, however, the Agencies issued a
significant revision of the 1992 Guidelines, largely limited to a discussion of
efficiencies. By that time the tide had shifted. Without much fanfare the
1997 Revision rejected the welfare tradeoff model in favor of one that is
215. See DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 28, at §5.3 (discussing market concentration
evaluation).
216. The HHI, or Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, is the sum of the squares of the market
shares of every firm in a market. For example, a market with four equal size firms would
have an HHI of 252 X 4 (625 X 4) = 2500. On the HHI and its properties, see HOVENKAMP,
supra note 32, at §12.4a.
217. See DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 28, at §5.3 (noting that this merger would fall within
the range of highly concentrated markets, where an HHI increase in the range of 100 to 200
points would presumptively be challenged).
218. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Harm and Causation, 100 WASH. U.L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021).
219. See DEP’T OF JUST., 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES § 3.5 (1984), https://www.justice.gov
/archives/atr/1984-merger-guidelines [https://perma.cc/TXJ4-PWCF] (explaining how the
Department of Justice examines efficiencies).
220. DEP’T OF JUST., 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES § 4 (1992), https://www.justice.gov/archiv
es/atr/1992-merger-guidelines [https://perma.cc/L24D-BG4S].
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more closely aligned with our conception of consumer welfare today. An
efficiency would be recognized only if it was “sufficient to reverse the
merger’s potential to harm consumers in the relevant market, e.g., by
preventing price increases in that market.”221 This formulation was restated
in the 2010 Merger Guidelines.222
That change rejected an anti-enforcement bias that permitted a merger
(or other practice) to be approved as welfare positive even if it reduced output
and raised prices.223 Rejecting that principle was an important step in getting
antitrust to adopt a true policy of favoring higher output and lower prices.
THE EMPIRICAL REVOLUTION IN ECONOMICS
Stigler’s and Friedman’s complaint that monopolistic competition is not
a part of economic science because it does not produce testable predictions
is outdated and seems quaint today. Given the lack of theory and significant
shortcomings in empirical methodology, however, it was not so in the 1940s
and 1950s. Thanks to Friedman’s overpowering stature, economic historian
Jan Keppler observes, monopolistic competition was simply not considered
to be a very promising subject of research.224 A particular deterrent was
Friedman’s conclusion that monopolistic theory provided no equilibrium
beyond that of a single firm.225
A vast amount of subsequent work largely corrected these views, all the
while revealing severe shortcomings in models of perfect competition. In
1987, a little after Easterbrook’s error cost paper was published, Timothy
Bresnahan and Richard Schmalensee hosted an important symposium on
“The Empirical Renaissance in Industrial Economics.”226 They used the term
“renaissance” to refer to important empirical work done mainly in the 1970s
and 1980s, although some of it stretched earlier. They briefly examined
older work defending Stigler’s attempts to preserve the Marshall model,
221. DEP’T OF JUST., 1997 MERGER GUIDELINES § 4 (1997), https://www.justice.gov/archi
ves/atr/1997-merger-guidelines [https://perma.cc/YAY3-QL6Y].
222. DEP’T OF JUST., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (08/19/2010) § 10 (2010), https
://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010 [https://perma.cc/S8EA-QQJ
V].
223. Hovenkamp, supra note 218.
224. Jan Horst Keppler, The Genesis of ‘Positive Economics’ and the Rejection of
Monopolistic Competition Theory: A Methodological Debate, 22 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 261,
264 (1998).
225. This presumed failure, Keppler observes, made monopolistic competition theory
particularly useless for macroeconomics, where the search for a general equilibrium theory
was one of economics’ most exciting fields. Id. at 273.
226. Timothy F. Bresnahan & Richard Schmalensee, The Empirical Renaissance in
Industrial Economics: An Overview, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 371, 371 (1987).
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while noting that historically there was “little explicit modeling of imperfect
competition.”227 They also noted that empirical studies of industries had
begun with a “case study” approach that focused on specific industries of
firms,228 and then moved to “cross-section” econometric studies which
compared different variables with each other and produced propositions that
could be tested empirically, soon after through the use of regression
analysis.229
In the 1970s came much more formal technical analysis of imperfectly
competitive markets.230
As Bresnahan and Schmalensee noted, a
characteristic of this work is that it stressed “systematic statistical analysis
rather than anecdotes”231–i.e., it met the Stigler/Friedman requirements of
testability. Part of this new movement was innovations in data set
construction, facilitated by great improvements in computer technology and
which enabled economists to break free from the use of census data that had
never done a good job of dividing the territory in competitively meaningful
ways.232 “[I]n a departure from the earlier traditions,” they observed, “the
tools of imperfect competition theory are now routinely used” to create and
test economic models.233 As noted previously, the use of the phrase
“imperfect competition” at this time was not a particular reference to Joan
Robinson’s book with that title. Rather, it referred to models that blended
oligopoly theory, product differentiation, and concerns about entry barriers.
The various studies that Bresnahan and Schmalensee included234
227. Id. at 372.
228. E.g., D.H. WALLACE, MARKET CONTROL IN THE ALUMINUM INDUSTRY (1937)
(presenting a case study of the aluminum industry). The “case study” approach dominated
industrial organization from the 1910s through the 1930s, particularly at Harvard, although it
remains a staple of many business schools today. See Hovenkamp, supra note 188, at 110–
14 (discussing the rising popularity of case studies).
229. E.g., Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power, in
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds.,
1988) (listing one such study); Richard Schmalensee, Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and
Performance, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (Richard Schmalensee & Robert
D. Willig eds., 1988) (same); Leonard Weiss, Quantitative Studies of Industrial Organization,
in FRONTIERS OF QUANTITATIVE ECONOMICS (M.D. Intriligator ed., 1981) (same). For later
work, see JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL
DATA (2d ed. 2010).
230. E.g., Richard Schmalensee, The New Industrial Organization and the Economic
Analysis of Modern Markets, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY (W. Hildenbrand ed., 1982)
(citing an example of this technical analysis); Michael Spence, Product Selection, Fixed
Costs, and Monopolistic Competition, 43 REV. ECON. STUD. 217 (1976) (same).
231. Bresnahan & Schmalensee, supra note 226, at 373.
232. Id.
233. Bresnahan & Schmalensee, supra note 226, at 374.
234. Among the papers were Timothy F. Bresnahan, Competition and Collusion in the
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exhibited these developments, and empirical work in imperfectly
competitive markets accelerated from that point. A broad range of studies
began to pursue questions about the exercise of market power, whether
unilateral or collaborative, in imperfectly competitive markets.235 Many of
these produced robust empirical results that were flatly inconsistent with
Stiglerian models of perfect competition. In the process, they undermined
the Marshall/Stigler idea of industrial structure that the landscape consisted
of discrete product markets with hard lines between them.
Instead, the range of differential elasticities among competing firms that
Stigler and Friedman had ridiculed became a subject of intense study. The
new work rejected on empirical grounds the idea of a “market” as a grouping
of products whose cross elasticity of demand or supply is infinitely high, and
with a high wall between them and outside products. Rather, the empirical
landscape resembled Chamberlin’s idea more closely: different firms
compete with other firms by varying but empirically measurable degrees.
The boundary that determines a market became more arbitrary and was
largely a matter of studying how individual firms and their customers
respond to a price change of a given magnitude. The larger the hypothesized
price change, the larger the market.
Importantly, these studies assumed relevance and importance for the
price movements of individual firms rather than of their markets as a whole.
In perfectly competitive markets, individual firms do not have distinctive
price movements. In an important paper in 1988, Baker and Bresnahan
produced a testable empirical methodology for estimating the market power
of a single firm in a product differentiated market.236 As they observed,
measuring the cross-elasticity of demand between individual product pairs
in differentiated product markets had proven very difficult, but it was
possible to measure a firm’s own price responses to changes in cost or
demand. That premise was itself inconsistent with perfect competition

American Automobile Industry: The 1955 Price War, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 457 (1987); Ian
Domowitz, R. Glenn Hubbard & Bruce C. Petersen, Oligopoly Supergames: Some Empirical
Evidence on Prices and Margins, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 387 (1987); Margaret E. Elade, Interfirm
Rivalry in a Repeated Game: An Empirical Test of Tacit Collusion, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 499
(1987); John C. Panzar & James N. Rosse, Testing for “Monopoly” Equilibrium, 35 J. INDUS.
ECON. 443 (1987); Richard Schmalensee, Collusion Versus Differential Efficiency: Testing
Alternative Hypotheses, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 399 (1987).
235. See also John Sutton, Is Imperfect Competition Empirically Empty, in THE
ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION AND EMPLOYMENT: JOAN ROBINSON AND BEYOND
225 (George R. Fiewel ed., 1989) (noting the extent to which imperfect competition models
produced testable results that were anomalous to perfect competition).
236. Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Estimating the Residual Demand Curve
Facing a Single Firm, 6 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 283 (1988).
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models. They examined a three-firm market for domestic beers–Pabst,
Coors, and Miller-and found that Coors possessed significantly more market
power than Pabst, which behaved more like a perfectly competitive firm
would behave.237
Methodologies for measuring the market power of firms in
differentiated markets have become normalized and simplified, and they
have become a staple of analysis in merger investigations. The theory of
“unilateral effects” in merger assessment, which now accounts for at least
half of the cases,238 is empirically driven,239 flatly inconsistent with perfect
competition, and in some but not all ways is much more consistent with
monopolistic competition.240
One important difference is that Chamberlin’s monopolistic
competition model assumed free entry. By contrast, unilateral effects merger
theory reaches situations where products are differentiated but entry barriers
are high or there are barriers preventing firms from repositioning their
products.241 Under the theory, while many firms might compete with one
another, different pairings of firms compete more closely than others.242
237. On the extent to which the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines take these
developments into account, see Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From
Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49 (2010).
238. See Darren S. Tucker, A Survey of Evidence Leading to Second Requests at the FTC,
78 ANTITRUST L.J. 591, 598 (2013) (noting predominance of unilateral effects concerns in
second requests).
239. See Steven Barry & Ariel Pakes, Some Applications and Limitations of Recent
Advances in Empirical Industrial Organization: Merger Analysis, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 247
(1993) (discussing use of empirical data). See also Nathan H. Miller et al., Upward Pricing
Pressure as a Predictor of Merger Price Effects, 52 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 216 (2017) (finding
these methodologies to be empirically robust); accord Sonia Jaffe & E. Glen Weyl, The First
Order Approach to Merger Analysis, 5 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 188 (2013)
(developing the methodology and citing earlier literature).
240. Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Products, 10 ANTITRUST 23 (1996). See
also Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal
Mergers, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 43 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008)
(identifying the competitive effects of mergers in different types of industries); Oliver
Budzinski & Isabel Ruhmer, Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey, 6 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 277 (2010) (explaining the use of merger simulation to determine
the effects of a possible merger); Jonathan B. Baker & David Reitman, Research Topics in
Unilateral Effects Analysis, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
ANTITRUST (Einer Elhauge ed., 2012) (discussing the different tools available to study merger
effects); PETER DAVIS & ELIANA GARCES, QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES FOR COMPETITION AND
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS (2010).
241. Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Products, 10 ANTITRUST 23, 23–24 (1996).
242. See Tommaso M. Valletti & Hans Zenger, Mergers with Differentiated Products:
Where do We Stand?, 58 REV. INDUS. ORG. 179, 180 (2021) (stating “it is well-known that
market shares can be off the mark in trying to account for consumers’ heterogeneous
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Further, thanks in substantial part to widespread digitization of transactions,
competitive responses have become far easier to measure.243
The new methods of assessing power and effects do not require a
market definition in the traditional sense; they measure firms’ price
responses directly, not by an inference drawn from market share.244 For
example, the technical concept of “upward pricing pressure” (UPP) refers to
an empirical device that estimates a firm’s profit-maximizing price before
and after a merger by balancing out reduced competition against any
efficiencies that the merger might produce.245 Here, the Supreme Court’s
position in the American Express case that market power for assessing
vertical practices requires a market definition is an unsettling step
backwards, particularly given the fact that the issue was never briefed and
neither alternative methodologies nor results were explored.246 What its
effects will be remains to unclear at this writing.
Successive editions of the United States government’s Horizontal
Merger Guidelines have reflected these developments, although generally
responding only after a new technique had become well established and
normalized within the discipline. The earliest Guidelines, particularly those
issued in 1968 and 1984, were dominated by concerns about market
definition and market shares.247 The 1984 Guidelines acknowledged the
relevance of product differentiation, but mainly to conclude that it tended to
switching patterns between differentiated products. When robust data are available, it is
therefore more sensible to assess competitive overlaps directly. . . .”).
243. See Jonathan B. Baker, Why Did the Antitrust Agencies Embrace Unilateral Effects,
12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 31 (2004) (discussing the rise of unilateral effects). See also Nathan
H. Miller & Gloria Sheu, Quantitative Methods for Evaluating the Unilateral Effects of
Mergers, 58 REV. INDUS. ORG. 143 (2021) (identifying the different formulas used to calculate
unilateral effects); Gregory J. Werden, Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers
I: Basic Concepts and Models, in 2 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1319 (ABA
Section of Antitrust Law 2008) (highlighting unilateral effects specific to horizontal mergers).
244. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers:
An Economic Alternative to Market Definition, 10 B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON. 1 (2010),
https://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/alternative.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U84Y-KL8M]
(showing an example of directly measuring a firm’s price response).
245. Developed in Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Products, 10 ANTITRUST 23
(1996). See also Valletti & Zenger, supra note 242; Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 244; Miller
et al., supra note 239.
246. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 & n.7 (2018). For a critique, see
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Looming Crisis in Antitrust Economics, 101 B. U.L. REV. 589, 528–
31 (2021).
247. Copies of all the Merger Guidelines back to 1968 can be found in a digital archive
maintained by the Justice Department. See Department of Justice Archive, DEP’T OF JUST., ht
tps://www.justice.gov/archives/doj-archive [https://perma.cc/PL5B-CGBC] (last visited Nov.
19, 2021) (listing the archived topics).
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mitigate merger concerns because cartels were more difficult to manage in
differentiated markets.248 This reflected Stigler’s position that the only real
concern falling short of monopoly is collusion.249 The 1992 Guidelines took
a much different approach, seeing mergers among firms producing
differentiated products as a distinctive subset that threatened “unilateral”
price increases in some cases.250 Finally, in the 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, product differentiation and unilateral effects mergers emerged as
a much more central feature of merger enforcement policy. Measurement
requires the agencies to assess differential rates of substitution among
product pairs–a concept that is meaningless in perfectly competitive
markets.251 At this writing the Biden administration has called for a new
revision of the merger guidelines that will very likely result in increased
enforcement.252
MARKET POWER IN THE ECONOMY
Progress in empirical techniques similar to those used in
248. See DEP’T OF JUST., 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES § 3.41 (1984), https://www.justic
e.gov/archives/atr/1984-merger-guidelines [https://perma.cc/TXJ4-PWCF] (considering how
the nature of the product and terms of sale can affect market power from a merger).
249. See discussion supra, text at notes 116–119.
250. DEP’T OF JUST., 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES § 2.21 (1992), https://www.justice.gov/
archives/atr/1992-merger-guidelines [https://perma.cc/L24D-BG4S]:
A merger between firms in a market for differentiated products may diminish
competition by enabling the merged firm to profit by unilaterally raising the price
of one or both products above the premerger level. Some of the sales loss due to
the price rise merely will be diverted to the product of the merger partner and,
depending on relative margins, capturing such sales loss through merger may
make the price increase profitable even though it would not have been profitable
premerger. Substantial unilateral price elevation in a market for differentiated
products requires that there be a significant share of sales in the market accounted
for by consumers who regard the products of the merging firms as their first and
second choices, and that repositioning of the non-parties’ product lines to replace
the localized competition lost through the merger be unlikely. The price rise will
be greater the closer substitutes are the products of the merging firms, i.e., the
more the buyers of one product consider the other product to be their next choice.
251. DEP’T OF JUST., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (08/19/2010) § 6 (2010),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010 [https://perma.cc/S8EAQQJV]. See Shapiro, supra note 237 (explaining how the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
deals with this).
252. Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987 (July 9, 2021). See Herbert
Hovenkamp, President Biden’s Executive Order on Promoting Competition: An Antitrust
Analysis, 64 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abst
ract_id=3887776 [https://perma.cc/2EVL-J9QC] (calling for the Agencies to revise the
Merger Guidelines).
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microeconomics has also resulted in greatly increased ability to measure
market power across the economy, as well as changes in market power over
time. Those developments also speak to the invalidity of the antienforcement error cost model. They are inconsistent with the idea that
markets move naturally to positions of greater competition.
Debates about the amount of monopoly in the economy and the extent
to which individual firms have market power have been going on for
decades. Methodologies for measurement that initially were crude and
flawed have improved very considerably and will continue to do so. The
important questions include: (1) Are industries generally becoming more
concentrated–that is, do they have fewer firms per market? (2) If so, is there
a positive link between market concentration and monopoly markups? (3)
To what extent can monopoly markups be measured directly, without
reference to market concentration or accordingly, market definition? And
(4) to what extent are larger markups a sign of a noncompetitive economy,
or do they have alternative explanations, such as higher rates of socially
beneficial innovation?
Addressing these questions is less useful for deciding individual
antitrust cases, but they do provide important information for evaluating the
state and appropriate direction of competition policy generally. They also
speak to such issues as formation of presumptions and burdens of proof. One
thing the emergent answers do indicate is that any error cost bias against
enforcement is unwarranted. Even if the evidence that the economy is
becoming less competitive is inconclusive, there is certainly no evidence that
markets tend to work themselves toward greater competition in any time
frame that we have been able to measure. At most, therefore, there should
be no anti-enforcement bias. Indeed, to the extent that the evidence does
indicate that the economy is becoming less competitive over time, an error
cost presumption that favors greater enforcement is called for.
Traditionally, most of these studies linked market power to
concentration, or the number of firms in a market. Surveys dating back to
the mid-twentieth century concluded that markets were in fact becoming
more concentrated and that the result was less effective competition, higher
markups, and general oligopoly stagnation.253 As noted previously, the 1950
amendments to the merger statute was based on these views, which were

253. Summarized in Richard Schmalensee, Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and
Performance, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 951 (Richard Schmalensee &
Robert D. Willig eds., 1989); see also Leonard W. Weiss, The Concentration-Profits
Relationship and Antitrust, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 184, 184–
233 (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al. eds., 1974).
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already prevalent at that time.254 They also drove important merger decisions
such as Philadelphia Bank, which made increases in concentration a prime
determinant of merger legality.255 That presumption, although with some
modifications, continues to guide horizontal merger analysis today when the
theory for challenging the merger is the likelihood of facilitating coordinated
interaction among the firms in a market.256
One thing many of those studies shared was that they were based on
industry classifications from what is now the North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS), administered in the United States by the
U.S. Census Bureau.257 The classification systems, which provide various
levels of detail, groups industries together by product similarity. Today,
most but not all studies of market concentration based on these data conclude
that American markets are becoming less competitive.258 One good analysis
of the studies over time finds small changes in concentration during the
period from 1963 to 1982, but significant increases after 1982 when the
Merger Guidelines were revised along more neoliberal lines.259 Another
study finds that increases in concentration have levelled off since 2002, but
it does not examine the period prior to that, thus missing the period of
greatest increase.260
254. See discussion supra, text at note 92.
255. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). See J. Robert Robinson,
Philadelphia National Bank at 50, 80 Antitrust L.J. 189 (2015) (noting the effects of the
previously mentioned Supreme Court case). For a convincing argument that the increase in
concentration, rather than the overall market concentration, is the better measure, see Volker
Nocke & Michael Whinston, Concentration Screens for Horizontal Mergers (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 27,533, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27533
[https://perma.cc/SW37-DLJY].
256. For a qualified defense of this presumption, see Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro,
Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure, and Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996 (2018).
257. North American Industry Classification System, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.
census.gov/naics/ [https://perma.cc/2HFK-EFPQ] (last visited Nov. 15, 2021). The system
replaced the older Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) System. See What Is the Difference
Between NAICS Codes and SIC Codes?, NAICS ASS’N (Mar. 20, 2017), https:/
/www.naics.com/what-is-the-difference-between-naics-codes-and-sic-codes/ [https://perma.
cc/22ET-NEBV] (explaining the differences between the new and old systems). On the
development of this approach to assessing industrial concentration, see Hovenkamp,
Progressive Antitrust Toolbox, supra note 61.
258. For a balanced summary, see Market Concentration – Note by the United States,
OECD (June 7, 2018), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2018)59/en/pdf
[https://perma.cc/6B3D-BUEW].
259. Sam Peltzman, Industrial Concentration Under the Rule of Reason, 57 J.L. & ECON.
S3, S101 (2014).
260. Robert D. Atkinson & Filipe Lage de Sousa, No, Monopoly Has Not Grown, INFO.
TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (June 7, 2021), https://itif.org/publications/2021/06/07/no-mo
nopoly-has-not-grown [https://perma.cc/S5N7-C9YP].
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These studies are not well designed for measuring the amount of
monopoly in the economy. An important problem is the lack of correlation
between relevant markets and the NAICS classifications, even at the most
detailed (six-digit) level. Indeed, two authors with considerable experience
in merger enforcement concluded in 2018 that the NAICS classifications
could be as much as 100 times larger than the definition of a relevant market
for antitrust purposes.261 The NAICS data are national, while many of the
markets in which concentration is to be measured are much smaller–regional
or even urban.262 Carl Shapiro concludes that the Census data do not permit
measurement of concentration in antitrust markets and may not be
informative at all for measuring changes in concentration over time.263 In
addition, concentration measures provide particularly poor estimates of
market power when products are differentiated.264
Much more promising are more recently developed approaches that
measure market power more directly and at the individual firm level as a
function of price/cost margins.265 These do not depend on definition of a
relevant market and thus do not reflect any measure of concentration. Direct
measurement of monopoly power has produced evidence of disturbing
macro- trends.266 Some of the commentary on this issue is heavily
ideological and superficial, but even if we confine ourselves to responsible,
technical measurement of market power, the results are about the same.
Scholars disagree about the amount267 but not the direction. Overall, margins
261. Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Don’t Panic: A Guide to Claims of Increasing
Concentration, 33 ANTITRUST 74 (2018).
262. Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714, 726
(2018).
263. Id. at 727–28.
264. See Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power, in 2
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1011 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds.,
1989) (explaining effects of product differentiation).
265. On the methodologies, see Jan De Loecker & Frederic Michel Patrick Warzynski,
Markups and Firm-Level Export Status, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 2437 (2012).
266. Documented in Shapiro, supra note 262. See also Kate Bahn et al., Reviving
Antitrust: Why Our Economy Needs a Progressive Competition Policy, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (June 29, 2016), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2
016/06/29/140613/reviving-antitrust/ [https://perma.cc/HM24-NN8W] (highlighting trends);
Jonathan Baker, Market Power in the U.S. Economy Today, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE
GROWTH (Mar. 20, 2017), https://equitablegrowth.org/market-power-in-the-u-s-economytoday/ [https://perma.cc/Q2PH-L2QR] (same).
267. For example, Robert E. Hall finds more modest increases in power. See Robert E.
Hall, Using Empirical Marginal Cost to Measure Market Power in the U.S. Economy (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25, 251, 2018), https://www.nber.org/pap
ers/w25251 [https://perma.cc/AER3-L3XS] (discussing his findings). See id. at 18 (finding
“substantial growth in market power” over the period from 1988 to 2015, although not as
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have risen,268 corporate profits have risen as a share of GDP, and labor
participation has declined.269 While some of the increase in margins is a
result of innovation, the overall effect appears to be strongly negative.270 In
any event, the idea that a significant portion of the increase in margins simply
reflects increased innovation is not reflected in annual growth in adjusted
GDP.271 The same thing is true of monopsony power in the labor market,
which has been increasing during the same period, resulting in lower wages
and reduced labor output.272
One qualification on these studies is that large firms that invest heavily
in research and development also tend to have higher fixed costs. These
typically show up as higher margins. As a result, high margins in and of
themselves do not necessarily indicate noncompetitive performance.273
Offsetting this, however, is disturbing evidence that mergers are more likely
to restrain innovation than to further it.274 That is to say, most of the
great as some other studies).
268. Hall, supra note 269 finds a weighted average Lerner Index increase from .11 to .28
during that period, and his numbers are among the more conservative. See also Jan de Locker,
Jan Eeckhout & Gabriel Unger, The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic
Implications, 135 Q.J. ECON. 561, 575 (2020) (finding significant markups since the early
1980s).
269. Shapiro, supra note 262, at 737. See also Carl Shapiro, Antitrust: What Went Wrong
and How to Fix It, 35 ANTITRUST 33, 33 (2021) (finding that “the share of the economic pie
going to labor has dropped while the share going to the owners of large businesses has grown,
and price/cost margins have generally risen in the United States in recent decades”); Jan De
Loecker, Jan Eeckhout & Simon Mongey, Quantifying Market Power and Business
Dynamism in the Macroeconomy (Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y Research. Discussion Paper No.
DP16097, 2021), https://repec.cepr.org/repec/cpr/ceprdp/DP16097.pdf [https://perma.cc/B76
U-9BLZ] (similarly finding that “[b]oth product and labor market dynamism, as measured by
net-entry rates and labor reallocation, has decreased, as has the labor share and labor force
participation”); Simcha Barkai, Declining Labor and Capital Shares, 75 J. FIN. 2421 (2020)
(finding a decrease in the labor share of gross value added accompanied by a large increase
in the share of pure profits); David Autor et al., The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of
Superstar Firms (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23,396, 2017),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w23396 [https://perma.cc/4RR6-VTPD] (citing to another work
with the same finding).
270. See De Loecker et al., supra note 269, at 1 (finding a significant growth in deadweight
loss, leading to a 9 percent decline in welfare during the period 1980–2016).
271. See U.S. GDP Growth Rate 1961–2021, MACROTRENDS, https://www.macrotrends.
net/countries/USA/united-states/gdp-growth-rate [https://perma.cc/82QS-G6Y6] (last visited
Nov. 19, 2021) (portraying GDP statistics via charts and graphs).
272. Id.; Jose Azar, Steven Berry & Ioana Marinescu, Estimating Labor Market Power,
SSRN (Sept. 18, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3456277 [https:
//perma.cc/M9LP-KNXJ].
273. See MACROTRENDS, supra note 271 (noting data specifically from the 2005–2006
period).
274. See Carl Shapiro, Competition and Innovation: Did Arrow Hit the Bull’s Eye?, in
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efficiencies that result from large firm R&D come about by internal growth,
not by merger.275 Indeed, leaving two innovative competitors to compete
against each other rather than merging is much more likely to increase both
output and innovation.276
CONCLUSION
For more than a quarter century the empirical industrial organization
literature has been racing away from the perfect competition models of the
1950s and before. In the process it has produced solid, differentiated
evidence of increasing market power in the economy on both the output and
the input sides. At the same time, the “relevant market” of traditional
antitrust analysis is becoming less important and its inaccuracies and other
failures increasingly prominent. It is too early to jettison the concept of the
relevant market from antitrust analysis, but roles have shifted. Today it
should be regarded as the “alternative” rather than the primary way of
assessing power, to be used mainly when data are limited or the relevant
antitrust query compels it.277
There is also considerable support for the conclusion that antitrust
policy, but particularly merger policy, took a significant wrong turn in the
mid-eighties. Causality is difficult to prove. Very likely the biggest culprit
was the change in merger policy brought about by the 1982 Merger
Guidelines,278 but the Supreme Court’s right turn on antitrust enforcement279
is certainly a contributing factor as well.
The more concerning issue is why people continue to follow a position
NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY REVISITED,
(Josh Lerner & Scott Sterns eds., 2012), https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c12360
/c12360.pdf [https://perma.cc/PG9R-GSC6] (explaining this phenomenon); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Harm and Causation, 100 WASH. U.L. REV. (forthcoming 2021); see
also Giulio Federico et al., Horizontal Mergers and Product Innovation, 59 INT’L J. INDUS.
ORG. 1 (2018) (same).
275. See discussion supra, text at notes note 28–29.
276. For strong empirical confirmation, see John Kwoka, The Structural Presumption and
the Safe Harbor in Merger Review: False Positives or Unwarranted Concerns?,
81 ANTITRUST L.J. 837, 837–72 (2017) (concentration over a certain threshold produces
anticompetitive effects); accord JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES:
A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY (2015).
277. For example, the concept of a relevant market, or at least something similar, remains
a useful tool to identify the range of viable competitors. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Vertical
Control, N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2021), (U. PA. INST. L. & ECON., Research
Paper No. 21-13, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3793733 [https
://perma.cc/T2RR-7R8J] (discussing the benefits of a relevant market).
278. See discussion supra, text at notes 257.
279. See discussion supra, text at notes 53.
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so long after it has lost its scientific support. Much of it, of course, is age
and path dependence. People learn things when they are young, make
successful careers, and are reluctant to change direction. Nearly every idea
worth having has provoked resistance, including Darwin, the marginalist
revolution in economics, and the Chicago School itself.280
In this case, however, something more disturbing is happening. The
Chicago School has moved from being an exciting development in
economics seventy years ago to a highly successful rationale for industry
capture today. Simply put, competition is a public good. The interest groups
that profit from a more competitive market tend to be individually powerless,
diverse, and not particularly well organized. Indeed, that has always been
the nature of competition. By contrast, those who stand to gain from the
preservation of high profits are individually larger, less numerous, and have
a common set of interests in the preservation of profit. This has turned the
error cost anti-enforcement bias into an important vehicle for rent seeking at
the expense of consumers, labor, and others who stand to profit from a more
competitive economy.

280. For some of the debates over marginalism and Darwin, see HOVENKAMP, supra note
72.

